

**BIG EAGLE, LITTLE DRAGON:
PROPAGANDA AND THE COERCIVE USE OF AIRPOWER AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM**

**BY
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ABSTRACT

In 1959, Alexander George reconstructed a methodology the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) used to analyze Nazi propaganda during World War II. This same methodology, with adjustments for differences in culture and ideology, might have been used to analyze North Vietnamese propaganda to help evaluate the effectiveness of America's coercive air campaign against North Vietnam. Throughout the war, North Vietnamese leaders used political propaganda to manipulate the opinions of the people it controlled and others they wished to influence. The analysis of this propaganda during Operation Rolling Thunder suggests the North's decision calculus remained insensitive to the effects of bombing, which helps explain why Rolling Thunder was unsuccessful in compelling Hanoi to stop supporting the insurgency against South Vietnam. However, the analysis of propaganda in 1972 indicates that President Richard Nixon's Linebacker operations played a key role in coercing North Vietnamese leaders to negotiate and sign an agreement to end the war.

The implications of such a propaganda analysis are significant. In the emerging political landscape of the twenty-first century, airpower may be applied more often to compel changes of behavior among international actors than to defeat them. The successful application of airpower may well depend on whether its coercive effectiveness can be measured rapidly and accurately. Propaganda analysis can be a useful tool for gathering information about an adversary's perceptions and attitudes, and it is particularly well suited for measuring changes in his strategies, intentions, and expectations. Thus, it should be considered a key supplementary source of intelligence for evaluating airpower's success in achieving broad political or military objectives, particularly those, like coercion or deterrence, that require changing an adversary's behavior. In essence, propaganda analysis should be considered one leg of a broadly based, interdependent, intelligence collection effort.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Vietnam War may have been the most frustrating chapter in America's use of airpower in armed conflict. Between 1965 and 1973, the US employed airpower in various attempts to coerce the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to stop supporting the National Liberation Front and its military appendage, the Vietcong. The United States also used airpower to coerce the DRV into stopping its own military efforts to unite North and South Vietnam by force.¹ The most significant of these air offensives was Operation "Rolling Thunder." Conducted from March, 1965 to October, 1968, Rolling Thunder gradually escalated the intensity of bombing in North Vietnam to compel the DRV to negotiate. It failed, but in 1972, in response to a North Vietnamese conventional invasion of South Vietnam, the US launched Operation "Linebacker," an interdiction campaign which culminated with the DRV agreeing to sign a peace settlement. Later, when negotiations floundered, the US resumed bombing with "Linebacker II," and the North Vietnamese returned to peace talks and signed an agreement.

Since that time, numerous studies have examined why airpower failed to compel the DRV's behavior to change during Rolling Thunder and why, conversely, the Linebacker campaigns seemingly succeeded. Many of these studies have focused on the capabilities, limitations, and modes of warfare, and a few have also examined the efficacy of the strategies employed. But an element that has received little attention to date is the means used to determine the coercive effectiveness of bombing while the effort was underway. Certainly, there were bomb damage assessments and intelligence analyses of the military and economic effects of the bombing, but few of these provided military or political leaders with rapid feedback on whether the application of airpower was achieving its ultimate objective, a behavioral change within the DRV. That information is important. With timely feedback, policy makers and air commanders may be able to modify operations to make them more effective. If necessary, they can stop those efforts that expend resources without producing the desired results. In fact, rapid feedback may

be the single most important element in any coercion operation. One largely neglected source of information that might have provided timely feedback on bombing effectiveness was propaganda.

Although propagandists often aim to mislead their audiences, the systematic analysis of their products can reveal a wealth of intelligence information. During the Second World War, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established a team of analysts dedicated to scrutinizing Nazi propaganda on a daily basis. Throughout the war, these analysts produced reports that provided information ranging from detailed orders of battle to the anxieties of the German High Command. In 1959 Alexander George studied the FCC program. He reconstructed the methodology the analysts employed and evaluated the accuracy of their reports. George concluded that overall, 81 percent of the inferences that FCC analysts drew from Nazi propaganda were accurate.²

The proceeding case study will demonstrate that propaganda analysis could have helped to measure airpower's effectiveness as a coercive instrument against North Vietnam. It employs a modified version of the FCC methodology to evaluate segments of North Vietnamese propaganda and identify the intelligence indicators that signaled Rolling Thunder could not succeed. Likewise, this study will demonstrate that indicators were present in the DRV's 1972 pronouncements that revealed the telling effects the two Linebacker campaigns had on North Vietnamese leaders.

However, before this study can evaluate whether North Vietnamese propaganda provided useful information on bombing results, it must examine the coercion strategies that guided bombing objectives. Therefore, the work begins with a review of the goals and the methods used to achieve them in Rolling Thunder's graduated punishment strategy. Similarly, it will explore the denial-by-interdiction strategy that comprised Linebacker, and the concentrated punishment strategy employed in Linebacker II, illustrating how those methods and objectives differed from Rolling Thunder's.

After outlining American coercion strategies, the work examines the nature of propaganda. Propaganda is a specialized kind of communication. This paper will explain its

characteristics and uses, examining both propagandists and their target audiences. A thorough grasp of this specialized medium will facilitate understanding the techniques the FCC used to analyze Nazi propaganda and those that will subsequently be used to evaluate the pronouncements of the DRV.

The FCC developed an elaborate schema for analyzing Nazi propaganda, and most of it is applicable to the North Vietnamese problem. Propaganda evaluation is composed of direct analysis, a method of extracting and tabulating data from the literal contents of messages, and indirect analysis, a more involved process of inferring information about the perceptions, intentions, and strategies of the propagandist and his masters. The FCC analysts used both methods to great effect. Consequently, this study will apply direct and indirect analysis to North Vietnamese propaganda, although the schema used reflects the differences between North Vietnamese propaganda and that produced by the Nazis.

Propaganda produced by the DRV displayed the cultural and ideological foundations of North Vietnamese society. The Vietnamese were, and are, a xenophobic people. The sources of their distrust lay largely in their historical, philosophical, and religious roots, but the contentious nature of Marxism contributed to it as well. Consequently, any schema designed to analyze propaganda produced by the DRV must include factors that account for their suspicious and defensive mindset.

The heart of this effort will consist of a case-study analysis of selected pieces of North Vietnamese propaganda. It will focus first on those produced during Operation Rolling Thunder, then compare it to the pronouncements released during the Linebacker campaigns. In each case, I will examine the content and characteristics of the data and infer from them the propagandist's goals and strategies. This process will lead to an analysis of the policies and intentions of the DRV elite, North Vietnam's small ruling clique, and their expectations in each situation. An evaluation of these conclusions based upon the actual conduct of American air campaigns will confirm that North Vietnamese propaganda signaled bombing's impact on the DRV elite and revealed changes in the leadership's behavior.

I must emphasize, however, that this study examines a limited volume of propaganda. Due to the small number of translated messages available, I have evaluated less than 100 items selected from the thousands generated by North Vietnam between 1962 and 1972. This restricts the amount and quality of information that can be deduced from the data and, consequently, reduces the scope and weight of the study's findings. Nonetheless, even the few messages examined reveals that DRV policies, perceptions, and strategies can be profiled from their propaganda. In short, the communications demonstrate that propaganda analysis could have been employed to measure the effectiveness of the coercive use of airpower against North Vietnam.

In the emerging political landscape of the twenty-first century, airpower may be applied more often to compel changes of behavior among international actors than to defeat them. Our leaders' ability to exert national will and resist the coercive designs of other nations may depend on the capacity to measure airpower's coercive effectiveness rapidly and accurately. Accordingly, the implications of propaganda analysis are enormous.

CHAPTER 2

COERCIVE AIRPOWER IN VIETNAM

The Vietnam War provides a classic example of an attempt to coerce an adversary with airpower. The U.S. entered the war determined to contain the spread of Communism, yet was constrained by fears of widening the conflict and President Lyndon Johnson's desire to focus public attention on his domestic agenda. Consequently, the U.S. fought a limited war and relied largely on bombing to compel the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to stop supporting the Vietcong and to cease its own military aggression against South Vietnam. The longest and most celebrated air campaign of the war, Operation "Rolling Thunder," failed to dissuade the North Vietnamese from their efforts to unite the country by force. Furthermore, events in 1975 confirmed that the U.S. ultimately failed in its initial aim of ensuring an independent and stable South Vietnam. Yet many scholars agree that Operation "Linebacker," conducted from May to October 1972, not only played a decisive role in repelling the North Vietnamese "Easter Offensive," but also compelled the DRV to negotiate seriously, and that "Linebacker II," conducted in December, was a significant factor persuading Hanoi to sign an agreement ending the war. This chapter summarizes the three principal coercive air campaigns in the Vietnam War--Rolling Thunder, Linebacker, and Linebacker II--and concludes with a discussion about using propaganda analysis to measure the coercive effects of airpower.

ROLLING THUNDER

In March 1965, faced with the impending collapse of the government of South Vietnam to the pressure of a North Vietnamese-supported insurgency, President Johnson began America's direct, sustained involvement in the war with Operation Rolling Thunder. American war aims, as the President explained them, were to contain Communism and assure an independent and stable South Vietnam.³ These broad goals translated into the objectives of employing airpower to compel the DRV to stop infiltrating men and supplies into the South and to negotiate a peace

settlement.⁴ However, the U.S. military could not be given *carte blanche* to apply unlimited force to reach these ends because President Johnson had competing objectives that could be achieved only by limiting the level of force he applied to North Vietnam. Chief among these "negative objectives" was the need to prevent the Soviets or Chinese from intervening in the conflict, which risked a superpower confrontation. Johnson considered this objective just as important as his commitment to preserving the independence of South Vietnam. Consequently, he prohibited his military chiefs from taking any action that could threaten the survival of the DRV, limited military actions he thought threatening to China or the Soviet Union, and made numerous announcements that the U.S. did not seek to destroy the Hanoi regime. Other negative objectives included the President's desire to preserve his domestic social programs. Committed to promoting his "Great Society," Johnson was concerned that overly aggressive military action would siphon off resources and divert public attention from his domestic agenda. The net result of these competing objectives was the measured application of airpower in a limited war.⁵

Given the limits imposed on applying force, the President's advisors could not agree on the best strategy to coerce the North Vietnamese. They cautioned against attacking North Vietnam's system of dams and dikes or other targets that would put civilians directly at risk. However, most civilian advisors advocated a strategy of gradual escalation focused on North Vietnam's nascent industrial base to exact a mild but ever-growing punishment on the Northern population. This strategy was similar to ideas expressed by political theorist Thomas Schelling, who had proposed that a government could be coerced by gradually increasing punishment until it changed its behavior to avoid the pain expected from further escalation.⁶ Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara articulated this concept in a memorandum to the President on 30 July 1965: "At any time, 'pressure' on the DRV depends not upon the *current* level of bombing but rather upon the credible threat of *future* destruction which can be avoided by agreeing to negotiate or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations."⁷

Johnson's military advisors had different ideas about how to coerce the North Vietnamese. Air leaders agreed that the North placed great value on its fledgling industrial

establishment, but they proposed the DRV would be more prone to stop supporting the insurgency if subjected to an unrestrained air offensive than the gradual, measured approach the civilians proposed.⁸ In 1964 they voiced their argument in a bombing plan that focused on a 94-target list of supply depots, ammunition storage sites, petroleum-oil-lubricants (POL) production and storage facilities, and lines of communication (LOCs). The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, advocated a "severe application of air power" to destroy all 94 targets in 16 days, thus "impairing North Vietnam's capacity to continue as an industrially viable state."⁹ Similarly, in February 1965 his successor, General John McConnell, advocated destroying all 94 targets in a 28-day campaign of concentrated bombing.¹⁰ On the other hand, Army Chief of Staff, General Harold Johnson and Chairman of the JCS, General Earle Wheeler, believed Hanoi would be compelled to stop supporting the war if airpower could interdict the men and equipment moving south.¹¹ Former general and current American Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, and his assistant Alexis Johnson, supported both a "maximum air campaign" and the concept of coercion through "fear of increased pain," but they too believed the air offensive should be focused on LOCs to limit the infiltration of men and supplies supporting the southern insurgency.¹²

After reviewing the options proposed and considering the differing objectives, President Johnson launched Rolling Thunder in March 1965 based on the 94-target list submitted by the Air Force. However, to assure he did not threaten the survival of North Vietnam or antagonize the Chinese or Soviets, Johnson prohibited attacks against targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas and those close to the Chinese border. Additionally, he limited the application of airpower to the gradual-escalation approach recommended by his civilian advisors. In April, Johnson's military and civilian advisors met in Honolulu to review the campaign's progress. Most of them agreed the tempo was about right and concurred with the President's constraint on striking Hanoi and Haiphong, for to do so would "kill the hostage."¹³ The conferees were confident in the outcome of Rolling Thunder, but none expected a Communist capitulation in less than six months.¹⁴ On the last point, at least, they were right.

Despite conclusions in Honolulu that the air war was running at the appropriate tempo, sortie rates advanced from 3,600 in April to 4,800 in June and continued to climb.¹⁵ Yet by August 1965 the government of South Vietnam was teetering once again, and it was apparent that Rolling Thunder was having no appreciable effect on North Vietnamese commitment to the insurgency. Consequently, Johnson focused the air effort more squarely on interdiction, expanded the target list, and increased the pace of operations.¹⁶

By December 1965 the U.S. had flown 55,000 sorties and dropped 33,000 tons of bombs.¹⁷ Believing the time was right to attempt a diplomatic settlement, President Johnson stopped the bombing in December for Christmas and extended that halt to give the North an opening to negotiate.¹⁸ When the DRV refused Johnson's overtures, bombing resumed at the end of January 1966. By then, intelligence reports indicated there were five NVA regiments operating in South Vietnam supported with an expanded fleet of trucks, so the targeting emphasis shifted to POL.¹⁹ But in late 1966 it became evident that even these measures had not deterred the North from continuing its aggressive policies, and Congressional pressure mounted for the administration to find an effective way to end the war. Consequently, Johnson removed most of the remaining constraints and bombed airfields, transportation, and industrial targets in and around Hanoi, Haiphong, and the buffer zone near the Chinese border.²⁰

By late 1967 there was serious disagreement whether Rolling Thunder was having any effect in coercing North Vietnam to stop supporting insurgency in the South. A special advisory group composed of esteemed former administration officials informed Johnson that continued force *would* compel the North to settle. McNamara disagreed with this assessment and advised the President to halt the bombing. Unable to persuade Johnson, McNamara made known his intentions to resign as early as November (he finally left in February 1968). An independent study conducted in December concluded that the campaign was not limiting the DRV's ability to support the insurgency, but the Commander in Chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, and the JCS were convinced it was "making it costly [for the DRV] to continue and impossible to mount a sizable conventional attack."²¹ Ultimately, the onset of the North's

massive Tet Offensive on 30 January 1968 shattered these illusions that Rolling Thunder had reduced North Vietnam's capability or will to mount military operations against South Vietnam.²²

The Tet Offensive proved fatal for Operation Rolling Thunder and the political career of Lyndon Johnson. After reviewing the dismal situation both in the air and on the ground in Vietnam, newly appointed Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford convened senior advisors on 25-26 March 1968 and concurred with their recommendation to withdraw from Vietnam. Personally shattered by recent events and Clark's subsequent recommendation to stop the bombing, Johnson announced in a 31 March 1968 televised address that he would end Rolling Thunder and not seek reelection in November.²³ The campaign wound down throughout the rest of the year, finally ending in October with U.S. aircraft sent North thereafter only on reconnaissance missions and "protective reaction strikes," flown in reprisal for North Vietnamese attacks on reconnaissance aircraft.²⁴

LINEBACKER

Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, faced far different conditions when he began his air war against North Vietnam in 1972. Committed to removing U.S. ground troops from Vietnam, Nixon was well along in his "Vietnamization" program in March when Hanoi launched its conventional offensive to topple the Saigon regime. Nixon had few of the negative objectives that had hamstrung his predecessor. With Sino-Soviet tensions high since 1969, he had skillfully played to each nation's perceived needs, supporting China's desire to end its diplomatic isolation and agreeing with the Soviets to begin talks to negotiate limits to the strategic nuclear arms race. As a result, he had reduced the threat that either the Chinese or the Soviets would intervene on behalf of North Vietnam when he decided to answer Hanoi's Easter Offensive with massive doses of airpower. Nixon also lacked Johnson's domestic constraints. With no ambitions to create a "Great Society" and with a Harris Poll showing that 55 percent of Americans supported answering the DRV's naked aggression by bombing North Vietnam, Nixon had a nearly free hand.²⁵

Nixon's war aims were also very different from President Johnson's. Determined to achieve "peace with honor," Nixon was committed to completing the Vietnamization program begun in October 1971, and withdrawing American troops without abandoning South Vietnam to imminent Communist takeover.²⁶ Consequently, Operation Linebacker was a massive interdiction campaign designed to choke off North Vietnam's support for the NVA offensive so that the Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam (ARVN), with substantial U.S. close air support, could defeat it on the field of battle. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Thomas Moorer, the campaign had three objectives: "a) prevent war material from entering North Vietnam and destroy the material already there; b) prevent the flow of troops and material already in North Vietnam; c) Interdict the flow of troops and materials from the North into combat areas, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."²⁷ But Nixon's overriding goal was to force Hanoi to accept an "in-place cease fire" and negotiate a peace settlement.

To achieve those objectives, President Nixon mined North Vietnam's harbors and applied massive amounts of airpower. Between April and October 1972, the U.S. dropped 155,548 tons of bombs on North Vietnam, a quarter of the tonnage expended during the entire Rolling Thunder campaign.²⁸ Whereas interdiction bombing had been ineffective during Rolling Thunder, the Easter Offensive was a conventional invasion with inelastic logistical requirements that were very susceptible to interdiction by air. Consequently, Linebacker had a telling effect on the NVA in South Vietnam. The ARVN had been on the verge of collapse when Nixon began bombing the North in April, but the Easter Offensive stalled in June and the NVA began a fighting retreat soon afterward.²⁹

The behavior of the DRV leadership changed significantly during the course of Linebacker. When Nixon's representative, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, met with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho to attempt negotiations shortly after the NVA captured Quang Tri in early May, Kissinger's proposals were met with DRV rhetoric.³⁰ But while openly insolent when ARVN was foundering, the tenor of North Vietnamese bargaining began to change as the tide of battle shifted against them. Kissinger and Tho met three times in July and August. On 1 August,

Le Duc Tho began to dilute his earlier demands that political and military issues be solved in one package and hinted that the ouster of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu might not be required to settle.³¹ Throughout September and October, the North Vietnamese seemed increasingly eager to end the war. On 8 October a breakthrough in negotiations occurred when Tho dropped the DRV's long-standing demands for the Southern regime to be replaced with a coalition government and agreed to accept an in-place cease fire in concert with the withdrawal of American troops.³²

An agreement was drafted and Nixon terminated bombing north of the 20th parallel while preparations were made for all the parties to sign it on 31 October; however, President Thieu balked when he saw the settlement for the first time on the 19th. Thieu refused to agree to the in-place cease fire that left NVA troops holding substantial territory in the South. He also felt the agreement's proposed "council of national reconciliation" was little more than a guise for a coalition government, an arrangement he stridently opposed.³³ Determined to stand by an ally, Nixon and Kissinger began efforts to arbitrate changes to placate Thieu, and Hanoi agreed to reopen negotiations. However, as October and November wore on, changes that the U.S. proposed were met with intransigence by the North, and in early December Tho began to withdraw concessions the DRV had made in the October agreement. Negotiations fell through on 13 December when the Americans, believing they were finally near a re-negotiated settlement, discovered the North Vietnamese had inserted seventeen additional changes to the agreement's text.³⁴

LINEBACKER II

President Nixon initiated his 11-day Linebacker II operation on 18 December to compel Hanoi to resume bargaining in good faith. Once again, the coercion was successful. Hitting essentially the same targets, this campaign was similar to the first Linebacker effort.³⁵ However, some crucial differences distinguish the latter offensive from the former. First, Nixon no longer emphasized turning back the NVA offensive in South Vietnam; the North had been repelled, and

though still on South Vietnamese territory, the NVA remained on the defensive when Linebacker II began.³⁶ Instead, Nixon's other aim had become paramount: he believed he had to coerce an acceptable settlement from the DRV before the newly elected Democratic Congress convened in January. The President was convinced that once in session, Congress would cut funding and force an end to U.S. involvement in the war, with or without the conditions that constituted his "peace with honor."³⁷ A second difference in the two operations was the weapons employed. Whereas B-52s had not been sent against Hanoi in Linebacker, December's overcast made the all-weather capabilities of the heavy bomber necessary.³⁸ Moreover, Nixon *wanted* B-52s over Hanoi and Haiphong. As Mark Clodfelter explains:

Unlike Linebacker I, the President aimed the December bombing directly at the North's will. The President desired a maximum psychological impact on the North Vietnamese to demonstrate that he would not stand for an indefinite delay in the negotiations... The B-52, with its massive conventional bomb load and all-weather capability, was air power's best tool to disrupt an enemy psychologically.³⁹

As a result, Linebacker II struck with a great deal more intensity than had earlier operations. During the short campaign, American aircraft flew more than 3,000 sorties, dropping some 20,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnam, mainly in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.⁴⁰ After eleven days of nearly continuous bombing (with a 36-hour Christmas break), Hanoi reopened negotiations and signed a peace settlement in January 1973.

COERCION AND PROPAGANDA IN VIETNAM

Since the Vietnam War, scholars have vigorously debated the causes of Rolling Thunder's failure and the successes of the two Linebacker operations. Over the course of the conflict, several bombing strategies were employed to coerce the DRV. Some were punishment-oriented; others focused on defeating North Vietnam's military strategy, thereby denying it the benefits of aggression. While the causes of coercive success and failure in Vietnam are a fruitful topic for study, it is outside the scope of this effort. This work is not concerned with why the employment of airpower first failed and then succeeded in compelling the North Vietnamese to

change their behavior, but rather whether propaganda could have been employed to measure that change.

To answer that question, we must develop and apply a method of propaganda analysis.

CHAPTER 3

PROPAGANDA AND PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS


Propaganda consists of the spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, cause, or person. In the broadest sense, it could include any means of transmitting ideas or information--covering almost every aspect of art and communication--because nearly all messages have, deliberately or accidentally, some persuasive content which influences behavior.⁴¹ This study, however, is specifically concerned with propaganda that is produced and centrally orchestrated by a totalitarian regime to advance its own political and military policies. To analyze this kind of communication, one must understand the nature of political propaganda and the process totalitarian regimes use to produce it. This chapter examines that nature and process; it then explores methods of direct and indirect analysis that can be used to extract intelligence information from propaganda to measure airpower's coercive effects.

Political propaganda is a tool governments use to manipulate the opinions of people both inside and outside of their control. It can be directed against civilian or military groups in the propagandist's nation, similar populations in an adversary's state, or aimed at selected audiences in third-party countries. In fact, a state may simultaneously target any number of formal and informal groups for persuasion campaigns designed to accomplish varying objectives. The nature of this tool is largely psychological. The propagandist attempts to manage the collective attitudes of his target by manipulating significant symbols.⁴² More specifically, he seeks to "provoke certain behavioral responses or attitudes by bringing about changes in the meanings that people attach to objects and events in the material world, rather than by changing directly those objects and events."⁴³ In essence, the propagandist strives to fashion a world of his own design in the minds of his audience, and he repeatedly invokes that world by attaching specific meanings to symbols he will use again and again.

Since the world view presented by the propagandist is contrived, analysts face a formidable challenge when trying to deduce reliable intelligence from political propaganda. Yet, the problem is not insurmountable. Truth is also an important tool for the propagandist, and skillful analysts can extract factual information from propaganda messages. Vladimir Lenin once said, "In propaganda, truth pays off," and propagandists have long recognized that they must avoid lying.⁴⁴ However, there are several points one must consider when evaluating the factual content of propaganda. First, since the propagandist's credibility rests on his truthfulness, details that the target audience can verify will be accurate. However, the propagandist may alter to his own advantage those facts that are difficult or impossible to prove. Second, facts will often be presented without a frame of reference with which to evaluate them. Silence or misinformation concerning the background of factual events often skews the audience's interpretation of the situation. Finally, a skillful propagandist will arrange facts in a way that leads the receiver to his own irresistible conclusion; the propagandist is a master of innuendo. As social historian Jacques Ellul explains: "The truth that pays off is in the realm of *facts*. The necessary falsehoods, which also pay off, are in the realm of intentions and interpretations. This is a fundamental rule for propaganda analysis."⁴⁵

There are several other assumptions an analyst can make when dealing with propaganda originating from a totalitarian regime. One can assume that all means of mass communication within the state are used to implement the government's foreign and domestic policy. These channels are all subject to centralized control, and the goals and strategies for which they are employed are closely coordinated with the policy calculations, estimates, expectations, and intentions of the leaders of the regime. This connection is critically important for the propaganda analyst. If intelligence objectives include assessments of the adversary's policies and perceptions--and they do when the goal is to measure airpower's coercive effectiveness--then understanding the linkage between the leadership's perception of an event, how that event might change its policy, and how that change might be reflected in the state's propaganda is crucial.⁴⁶


When Alexander George evaluated the FCC's methodology for analyzing Nazi propaganda, he developed a schema depicting the policy-propaganda linkage evident within that totalitarian regime (see Fig. 1). George proposed that at any given time the Nazi elite (leadership clique) assessed changes in political or military situations and estimated the potential outcomes in each case. Reacting to those expectations, leaders anticipated future adjustments in policies and actions of their adversaries and, if necessary, adjusted their own policies and intentions to minimize the costs or maximize the benefits each challenge or opportunity presented.⁴⁷ Since the Nazi propaganda machine was highly disciplined and closely tied to the state's policy process, George asserted that changes in elite policy were quickly reflected in the goals guiding the directives and techniques that comprised the regime's propaganda strategy. That strategy then became the lens through which propagandists examined each situational development and the lexicon by which they translated their description of events into propaganda.⁴⁸



There are two important points regarding the action schema for producing propaganda in a totalitarian society. First, propaganda is the "product of two interrelated behavioral systems: the *political decision-making system* and the *propaganda decision-making system*."⁴⁹ The two systems are inseparably tied, with the propaganda system serving in an auxiliary relationship to the political system. Consequently, the communications produced by this assemblage is an "instrument of purposive political behavior."⁵⁰ The second point is that changes in propaganda are driven by changes in the situational factors at the other end of the schema. The term

"situational factor" refers to an actual political or military circumstance that both adversaries usually know about to some degree. Situational changes may stem from any combination of three sources: change introduced by the political or military actions of the propagandist's camp, those caused by actions of the analyst's camp, and situational changes caused by objective circumstances, such as weather, or introduced by third parties which may favor or hamper either antagonist.⁵¹ The propagandist's side may alter a situation by undertaking some new political or military action such as launching an offensive. Alternatively, the analyst's side may change the situation by actions such as revising a bombing strategy or expanding a target list. Situational changes introduced by third parties could include actions such as a decision to support one side or the other or to intervene in the conflict. Analysts are often familiar with the situational factors feeding into the process; in other cases, factual content within the propaganda can reveal a situational change or provide details about one that is little known to the analyst. In any case, given a known change at one end of the schema and the content and characteristics of the communication produced at the other end, propaganda analysis becomes a function of reconstructing the intervening variables. This methodology is one of generalization and inference, shaped by the framework of the action schema and the historical context of the propaganda itself.⁵² George identified two methods of inference: *direct* and *indirect*.

The direct method of propaganda analysis is an approach in which evaluators extract and tabulate data from the literal contents of messages. Focusing on factual details within the communications medium, this method bypasses behavioral variables in the action schema and attempts to infer elite calculations or situational factors directly from content indicators. To use the direct method effectively, analysts must identify and correlate details in the propaganda that are non-causal in nature, such as those that are insensitive or independent of possible variations in the propagandist's strategy. Figure 2 depicts an analytical schema for the direct method of propaganda analysis.⁵³




The direct method is useful in the preliminary phase of analysis, especially when analysts face the task of scanning large volumes of communications material.⁵⁴ Focusing on numerical data and frequency tabulations of words, clichés, stereotypes, and slogans, this approach has some utility in identifying one-to-one correlations between different sources and media, but analysts must recognize that there is a great deal of uncertainty in these correlations. Consequently, direct analysis can rarely be relied on to support a specific inference in any single case. In sum, direct analysis is a valuable tool for hypothesis formulation, but testing those hunches drawn directly from literal message contents requires careful application of the indirect method.⁵⁵

The indirect method of propaganda analysis is used to evaluate the motives and strategies behind "highly instrumental communications" aimed at manipulating audiences.⁵⁶ This approach recognizes that the propagandist's behavior, as he selects communications goals and strategies, constitutes an intermediate step between the intentions of the political elite and the content of the propaganda subsequently produced. Consequently, this method requires analysts to identify those characteristics in the material that are sensitive to and dependent on the originator's propaganda strategy.⁵⁷

As Figure 3 depicts, the indirect method consists of a series of interconnected inferences and generalizations in which the analyst attempts to reconstruct the sequential variables that comprise the action schema. The first step in this methodology is to establish the propaganda

goal or strategy underlying the contents of the message. From there, focusing on situational factors deduced from direct analysis or collateral sources, the analyst infers the political elite's intentions. That knowledge, in turn, leads to conclusions concerning what the propagandist's masters perceive about the situation and the potential outcomes they expect.



Inferences developed using the indirect method of analysis rely largely on generalizations drawn from a rational methodology called "logic-of-the-situation." This way of thinking resembles what some professionals call "clinical judgment" and is often used by historians, political scientists, and other individuals in daily life when the task at hand involves attempting to understand how another person thinks.⁵⁸ Using this approach, the analyst assumes the actor (propagandist or political decision maker, depending on the variable examined) will "choose among alternative courses of action on the basis of his assessment of the logic of the situation which confronts him."⁵⁹ Starting with the initial conditions and knowing what course of action the actor ultimately selected, the analyst assumes the action was rational and attempts to assemble the intervening policy or strategy variables that would logically explain it.⁶⁰ The resulting generalizations occur in specific steps, or actions, in the inference process. The four major steps yielding generalizations are:

1. From content to propaganda goal or strategy.
2. From propaganda strategy to elite intention or policy.
3. From intention or policy to elite expectation and estimate.
4. From estimate to situational factor.⁶¹

These generalizations vary in detail and specificity, depending on how much the analyst knows about the situation at hand and the actor's policy and strategy history. Typically, generalizations can be categorized from general to specific as follows:

1. General knowledge of the character of interrelationships among variables comprising a system of behavior.
2. Knowledge of how people in general behave when engaging in the type of activity under study.
3. Knowledge of how particular individuals behave...
 - a. Generalizations about preferred solutions and habitual behavior of the elite and propagandists.
 - b. Generalizations about how the elite and propagandists behave when rational choices are difficult.⁶²

As seen, the direct and indirect methods of analysis complement each other. Direct analysis is used to digest large volumes of communications material, extract raw, factual data, and to formulate hypotheses about the intentions of the propagandist and his elite masters. Indirect analysis, in turn, submits those facts and hypotheses to logical analysis to reconstruct the propagandist's strategy and the political elite's policies, perceptions, and intentions. Logical constructs developed in indirect analysis are then applied in direct analysis when evaluating subsequent messages, improving the accuracy of data extraction and hypothesis formulation. Over time, the information flow becomes highly refined, but there is an obvious danger imbedded in this kind of system. The circular logic employed in the mutually supporting methods of analysis make the whole operation prone to self-sustained error. Faulty inferences concerning the adversary's propaganda strategy can lead to inaccuracies in subsequent fact recognition, contributing to poor hypothesis formulation. This degraded input from direct methods, in turn, can lead to even worse inferences during subsequent attempts at indirect analysis.

To avoid this pitfall, analysts must employ *cross-sectional analysis* of the adversary's entire propaganda behavior at any given time. Cross-sectional analysis is the process of evaluating and cross-referencing the adversary's communications products targeted at different audiences using a variety of media. Articles published in theoretical journals will have dramatically different characteristics than those published in newspapers. Radio broadcasts

targeted at sophisticated international audiences will have differing degrees of factual content from those directed toward rural citizens. Propaganda developed for internal consumption, to inform and persuade functionaries within the regime, will often tell a different story than that fed to the general public. Consequently, propaganda analysts must collect and evaluate a wide assortment of message products to cross-reference factual details and get the broadest perspective of the adversary's propaganda strategies.⁶³

Having completed this overview of Alexander George's methodology for propaganda analysis, the question that remains is how applicable is this approach for extracting information from North Vietnamese propaganda. Will the George Methodology support efforts to measure the coercive effects of airpower during the Vietnam War?

In broad terms, this method of propaganda analysis will support the task at hand quite well. Both Nazi Germany and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) were totalitarian regimes with highly disciplined propaganda machines closely tied to the designs of political elites. Both considered propaganda a key instrument of policy and generated volumes of it in efforts to further their political goals. However, while generally well suited for evaluating communications produced by totalitarian regimes, the George Methodology does not account for differences in culture or ideology.

When George reconstructed the techniques the FCC used to analyze Nazi propaganda, he determined that analysts always based their inferences on "unstable variables," the changes in the seven "antecedent" conditions that comprised the action schema.⁶⁴ Factors such as culture, ideology, and the image propagandists and their elite superiors held of the opponent rarely changed throughout a given conflict, so George designated them "stable variables." While he conceded the stable variables sometimes helped analysts refine their inferences about the precise character of the unstable variables, he emphasized that the process was driven by change; the role stable variables played in the FCC analysis was implicit and usually unconscious.⁶⁵

That approach served the FCC well for interpreting propaganda produced by Nazi Germany, a nation with a Judeo-Christian heritage similar to their own, but it is inadequate for

inferring changes in the behavior of propagandists and political elites from a nation with a significantly different cultural foundation--a nation such as North Vietnam. Propaganda is a form of communication, and that is precisely where the problem lies. As Ken Booth explains:

We sometimes do not know what strategists and politicians in other countries mean by the concepts they use. And we sometimes assume that they mean the same as we mean, especially when the same word is used. All this places a premium on the most careful use of language.⁶⁶

One might add, "this also places a premium on the most careful *interpretation* of language," especially where propaganda analysis is involved. Booth considers the word "ethnocentrism," a synonym for being "culture-bound," which he defines as "the inability of an individual or group to see through the eyes of a different group."⁶⁷ But that is exactly what a propaganda analyst must do. To sense changes in the enemy's perceptions and intentions, the analyst must look through the enemy's eyes, see the world as the enemy sees it, and ultimately, think the enemy's thoughts. If the analyst fails to assume the enemy's mindset, the logic-of-the-situation he applies to his inferences will succumb to what Booth considers the principal fallacy of conventional strategic thinking: "If my opponent is rational, he will do what any other rational man would do in his situation. I am rational. Therefore, he will do what I would do in his shoes. If I were in his shoes I would...."⁶⁸

The following section probes the thinking of the North Vietnamese propagandist and describes the world as he sees it. It reviews the cultural and ideological foundations of North Vietnamese communications and offers customized schemata for analyzing propaganda orchestrated by the DRV.

CHAPTER 4

NORTH VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA

North Vietnamese propaganda clearly reflects the essence of its complex cultural and ideological heritage. Like other societies rooted in the Confucian tradition of Sinic Asia, the Vietnamese deeply venerate ritual and moral authority. Yet the most salient traits in their national character stem from a history of struggle. For more than two thousand years the Vietnamese have been shaken by more powerful forces--first Asian, then European. Theirs is a history of "invasion, siege, occupation, and rebellion interspersed with lesser moments of dissidence, covert military opposition, and other forms of social sabotage."⁶⁹ The product of this experience is an obsessive nationalism, darkened by suspicion, hostility, and the acceptance of warfare as a way of life. More recently, Marxism contributed to this mindset. Fusing its dream of political and economic revolution to Vietnam's fanatical nationalism, Communist ideology intensified the xenophobia already present in the nation's collective consciousness. The cumulative result of these various social pressures is remarkable: Confucian pretensions of superior morality, years of anti-colonial struggle, and Marxist-Leninist philosophy have led the Vietnamese to regard power in a convoluted, clandestine way.⁷⁰ These factors color their propaganda dramatically.

This chapter discusses the cultural and ideological foundations of North Vietnamese propaganda and offers a customized methodology for analyzing it. It begins with a brief description of the historical and philosophical roots of Vietnamese society. Next, it discusses how Marxist ideology melded with--and altered--the Vietnamese xenophobic mindset, ultimately making the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV) official communications unique. Finally, the chapter concludes by providing revised schemata for analyzing the internal and external communications orchestrated by the DRV.

HISTORY

Vietnam's bitter struggle for national identity began more than two millennium ago. In the third century B.C., Tang China annexed the tiny kingdom as it assimilated and Sinicized the northeastern coastal region of the Indochinese peninsula. From that time on, much of Vietnam's history consisted of foreign occupation and oppression. The Vietnamese, however, never lost their sense of national identity or acquiesced to domination. They tenaciously resisted foreign overlords through dissent and covert opposition, punctuated by occasional outbursts of open rebellion. The most famous example of the latter occurred in A.D. 39 when a pair of teenage girls, the Trung sisters, led a nationalist revolt that lasted three years before being crushed by the Tang. Facing defeat, the Trungs committed suicide and etched their resolve forever on the nation's psyche.⁷¹

In the ensuing centuries the Vietnamese experienced long periods of oppression, broken by pauses in which they played the aggressor when Chinese power occasionally waned. Their experience in guerrilla warfare began in the tenth century when they repeatedly frustrated and eventually defeated the Tang occupation force. The climactic battle took place in 938 at Bach Dang in the Red River Delta near Haiphong. In that episode, Vietnamese guerrillas spiked the river bed, then lured flotillas of armed junks carrying the Tang force upriver at high tide. As the tide receded and the Chinese returned down river, the junks were impaled on the spikes. The Vietnamese attacked the stranded warriors, defeating them and killing thousands. But this victory provided the kingdom only temporary respite.⁷²

The thirteenth century brought three Mongol-Chinese invasions, and the following centuries saw conflict with Indochinese neighbors to the south and west and China's Ming dynasty to the north. Often relying on guerrilla tactics, the Vietnamese repelled each of the Mongol onslaughts. As their power grew, the Vietnamese became more aggressive and eventually subdued the Indo-Malay Chams, burning two major cities and massacring tens of thousands. But in 1407 the Ming Chinese invaded and occupied Tonkin. In response, Vietnamese General Le Loi mixed guerrilla operations with conventional warfare and waged a

protracted war of exhaustion. By 1418 his constant harassment had forced the Chinese to garrison troops in scattered fortified towers in a futile effort to keep open their main lines of communication. Le Loi finally defeated the Ming in a decisive battle at Tot Dong, west of Hanoi, in 1426. Afterwards, in a classic face-saving gesture, the victorious general provided the Chinese hundreds of junks and thousands of horses to transport their army home. Two years later, China recognized Vietnam's independence in a formal peace treaty and Le Loi reciprocated in a vein of pragmatism that would become characteristic of the Vietnamese in future centuries--he underwrote Vietnam's security by reinstating the kingdom's tributary tie to the Chinese.⁷³

Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Vietnamese expanded their empire into territories farther south. After conquering the Cham, they confronted the Laotians and the Khmer. Driving the Khmer from the Mekong Delta and pushing the Laotians back, they finally established the borders of Vietnam in a form that remained relatively unchanged into the twentieth century. These expansions and border adjustments were often brutal, as the Vietnamese transferred frustrations built up during centuries of Chinese oppression into aggression against their neighbors. As Lawrence Grinter explains:

This expansion was the outlet for a strong, nationalistic and revenge-prone culture harboring centuries of resentment and inferiority feelings at the hands of the Chinese and ready to become regional overlord at the expense of the Khmer, Cham, and Laotians....the Vietnamese expansionist attitude resonates with a kind of Confucian "cultural evangelism" and "hierarchical vision of interstate relations" reinforced by a "psychologically defensive imitation" of the way Vietnam had been treated by stronger powers.⁷⁴

Defeating the Ming freed Vietnam from foreign occupation for nearly 400 years, and campaigns against the Khmer and Laotians secured the empire's borders. By this time, though, Vietnam was a society in which conflict had become the norm and peace an aberration. With their western neighbors cowed and the relationship with China stable, the Vietnamese turned against one another in civil war. In the mid-sixteenth century, the southern pioneers rebelled against warlords who supported the imperial dynasty in Hanoi. That struggle lasted 150 years, after which the contending regimes partitioned the country near the 17th parallel, roughly where

the 1954 Geneva Accords would later divide North and South Vietnam following the French Indochina War. The deep bitterness developed during this conflict is the source of much of the animosity between northerners and southerners during the twentieth century.⁷⁵

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Vietnamese independence ended once again when the French colonized Indochina. Europeans had gradually established a presence in the country through missionary activities during the previous two hundred years. In 1799, hoping for further access, trade concessions, and glory for France, a group of French adventurers helped the deposed king of South Vietnam, Nguyen Ahn, defeat the rival government and regain his throne. Turning north, Nguyen Ahn reunited the country once again and installed himself as emperor in the old imperial capital of Hue. But to France's chagrin, he never granted the trade concessions or religious freedoms the French expected. Fearing the effects Western influence might have on his Confucian imperial system, he followed China's lead and closed Vietnam to all but a few foreigners. His edict held until 1860 when the French, citing abuses against Christian missionaries, moved into Saigon in force. Coercing then Emperor, Tu Duc, to cede the adjoining provinces to their administration, the French then used one pretext after another to expand their control until all of Vietnam was "under their protection." In 1887 the French formed the Indochinese Union in which they administered Chochinchina, the southern-most part of modern-day Vietnam; Annam, the middle section of the current country; Tonkin, the northern-most section surrounding the Red River; and Cambodia (Laos was added six years later). But though the Vietnamese were outclassed by modern European troops in open battle, they never stopped resisting French efforts to subdue the countryside. Despite their success in occupying Vietnam, the French never succeeded in pacifying it. Nor would the Japanese or the Americans.⁷⁶

Vietnam's long history of conflict has left indelible marks on the nation's social consciousness. Most notable are the society's extreme nationalism and collective commitment to warfare. But just as profound, though perhaps not so readily apparent, is the way that experiences under both the Chinese and the French have colored the Vietnamese concept of power. Having endured centuries of domination, the Vietnamese have learned to imitate their oppressors. As

Asian scholar Lucian Pye explains, although they harbor intense feelings of resentment toward the Chinese and the French, they have come to "psychologically identify with the aggressor," and have thereby adopted the arrogance of their former colonial rulers.⁷⁷ Pye further observes:

...the Vietnamese, in spite of their deep hatred for their longtime Chinese rulers, come closer than all the other non-Chinese Confucian societies to emulating the Chinese system of power. This was particularly the case [historically] with respect to the Chinese ideal of rule by a bureaucracy staffed with mandarins well-versed in the Confucian classics.⁷⁸

China's Confucian influence deeply affected Vietnam's concepts of religion and philosophy. Ultimately, the combination had profound effects on North Vietnamese propaganda.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

The many centuries of Chinese occupation left a strong impression on the religious and philosophical foundations of Vietnamese culture. Like China, Vietnam's philosophical thought is based on a blend of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism. This amalgam shapes the society's value system and the way its people relate to nature, their government, and one another; it literally defines the way the Vietnamese perceive the world. As a result, even though North Vietnam claims to be an atheistic society, the religious and philosophical roots of its culture define the frames of reference in which its people communicate. Consequently, Vietnamese traditional religious and philosophical thought permeates DRV propaganda.

During the formative years of Vietnamese society, between the first and sixth centuries B.C., people practiced an assortment of animistic nature cults. But as Buddhism filtered into China from India in the first several centuries A.D., it also spread to her vassal states and Vietnam became predominantly Buddhist. Buddhism is a mystic discipline in which adherents hope to achieve spiritual "enlightenment" and thereby liberate themselves from the sufferings of the physical world.⁷⁹ It is also a moralistic faith; devotees are encouraged to "follow the eight-fold path" of proper conduct.⁸⁰ Although Buddhism is an ascetic doctrine encouraging its followers to separate themselves from secular matters, Buddhist clergy in Vietnam (as in China) eventually

developed a great deal of political, economic, and social influence. By the thirteenth century, monks were counselors to the king and monasteries owned large domains cultivated by serfs.⁸¹ Yet powerful as they were, the Buddhists were already in decline by the end of that century as Confucianism began to assert its influence.

Confucianism became the most influential system of thought in traditional Vietnam. Formally recognized with the first imperial examination in A.D. 1075, it served as the nation's "intellectual and ideological backbone" for ten centuries.⁸² Confucianism is a secular philosophy stressing man's obligation to society.⁸³ First and foremost an ethical system, it emphasizes four central principles: tolerance toward others, knowledge, courage to fulfill obligations, and behavior in accordance with rituals.⁸⁴ But Confucianism is an educational system as well. Confucius' esteem for knowledge drove later followers to scholarship with a passion that bordered on obsession. His writings, and those of later Confucian philosophers, were artistically transcribed, memorized, and chanted.⁸⁵ Students studied history diligently, not so much for the factual account of events but to find examples of proper behavior. North Vietnamese writer and propagandist Nguyen Khac Vien explains: "Confucian education aimed less at imparting knowledge than at inculcating an ethic, giving rules to live by and furnishing principles of conduct."⁸⁶ Given this emphasis on ethical training, it is not surprising that Confucians came to use oral and written examinations to measure the merit and moral development of their devotees. From the eleventh century to the dawn of the twentieth, regional examinations granting degrees were held all over Vietnam, and imperial tests were held in the capital to select individuals for appointment to Confucianism's highest position, mandarin.⁸⁷ Eventually, Confucian mandarins controlled every aspect of Vietnamese society. They replaced the monks and feudal lords in government, and bureaucratic posts from the village level up were filled by their appointees, selected by competitive examinations.⁸⁸

During the ten centuries that Confucianism held sway, it made a profound impression on Vietnamese culture, and its influence clearly colored North Vietnam's official communications after the 1954 Geneva settlement. Propagandists were obsessed with proving the moral

superiority of DRV leaders. Articles in party magazines and theoretical journals repeatedly recite the Marxist interpretation of the nation's history in a ritualistic effort to verify the ethical foundation and historical continuity of their cause. Even titles of address reflected an ever-present Confucian mindset. In any Confucian culture, the family is considered the proper model for government; "relations between ruler and subject are seen as analogous to those between parent and child."⁸⁹ Characteristically, North Vietnamese propaganda habitually referred to "Uncle Ho," "your brothers in the North," and other filial terms of address.

Although both Buddhism and Confucianism played key roles in shaping the cultural context of Vietnamese communications, so too did the significance of the *Tao*. Taoism is a mystical philosophy that focuses on man's relationship to nature. Native to China, it probably entered Vietnam in about the same period as Buddhism and Confucianism, and it is compatible with both of those doctrines.⁹⁰ The word "*Tao*" literally means "way." Taoism is built around a concept of the "*way*," a single unifying principle which lies behind surface appearances, a unity of which all phenomena are a part. This *way* manifests itself in the Taoist cosmology as a duality of opposites which comprise the universe, or what the Chinese refer to as "*yin* and *yang*." *Yin* represents all the soft, dark, yielding, or female characteristics of the universe and *yang* the hard, strong, male attributes of existence. According to Taoism, everything in creation passes through endless cycles of *yin* and *yang*, and wisdom consists of being in harmony with these rhythms of nature.⁹¹ While this notion appears esoteric to Westerners, it is a fundamental principle taken for granted in the Vietnamese world view. And the belief that the ebb and flow of the *Tao* is an all-powerful force controlling the universe coincides with the Confucian belief that practicing moral virtue enables leaders to "tap omnipotent forces which give order to the entire country."⁹² This idea, too, is reflected in North Vietnamese propaganda. As Lucian Pye explains:

The belief that power can exist beyond the control of anyone was once formalized in the Taoist doctrine of the *way*, and in the principle of non-effort or *wu-wei*. In modern times the Communists have recreated it in their almost magical beliefs in the "dialectic" and in the Marxist linear laws of "history."⁹³

The rhetorical fashion in which the Vietnamese Communists explain history provides a new lexicon for describing the turning of the *Tao*. Preferring to cloak their rationale in science and logic, modern Communists do not speak of *yin* and *yang*. Yet the North Vietnamese were acutely sensitive to the ebb and flow of political and military power, and they believed they capitalized on their ability to harmonize with the *Tao* in 1968. Notice how Tran Van Tra, commander of the People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam (Vietcong) from 1963 to 1975, describes the decision process that led the Communists to launch the Tet Offensive:

...the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee made a complete analysis of both sides and proceeded to identify the turning point of the war. The party concluded that confusion prevailed in the enemy ranks, which were divided between the "hawks" and the "doves" and that the U.S. president was at a crossroads. It recognized this precious opportunity to make a great strategic move on the battlefield in order to "shift our revolution to a new stage, that of decisive victory."⁹⁴

It may be argued that Tra, writing 25 years after Tet, is exaggerating the degree of deliberation that Communist leaders applied to their decision to amplify the legend of their greatness. Nonetheless, whether the Central Committee actually recognized in 1967 that the turning point of the war was at hand, the fact that Tra explained the event in those terms reveals the context in which he views it. Tra's explanation may be Marxist rhetoric, but his frame of reference is clearly Taoist.

IDEOLOGY

When Marxist-Leninist ideology melded with Vietnamese culture in the early twentieth century, it produced a new variant of Communism with propaganda messages tailored to the Vietnamese temperament. The Communists outwardly rejected the cultural vestiges of Vietnam's colonial past. But they recognized the persuasive power inherent in the nation's historical and philosophical themes. Thus, they adopted those themes and molded them to their own ends. The resulting propaganda focused on inflaming the country's strident nationalism and

directing those passions toward the Communist goals of political, social, and economic revolution.

The Vietnamese Communists, like Marxists everywhere, attempted to rationalize the tenets of their doctrine on the basis of science and logic; consequently, they outwardly rejected the mystical and ethical foundations of Vietnam's culture.⁹⁵ Moreover, having observed how ineffectually Confucian intellectuals had struggled against French colonial oppression, the Communists concluded that traditional thought actually hindered Vietnam in her pursuit of freedom and social revolution. In 1962 Vien asserted, "...Confucianism represents much more than a doctrine inscribed in venerable texts; it is a legacy of history, a fundamental legacy to be understood, fought against, and overcome in the course of the historical change which the country is now undergoing."⁹⁶

Yet Vien also acknowledges that Confucianism and Marxism are compatible in several respects: both are earthly, socially-oriented doctrines emphasizing morality in leadership and seeking the best formula for government.⁹⁷ Adding the fact that the Communists began their indoctrination efforts at the village level, the traditional starting point for Confucian education, one can see why Marxism found such fertile ground for recruiting in the Vietnamese countryside. As Vien explains:

Marxism [unlike Christianity or Islam] was not baffling to Confucians in that it concentrated man's thoughts on political and social problems. By defining man as the total of his social relationships, Marxism hardly came as a shock to the Confucian scholars who had always considered the highest aim of man to be the fulfillment of his social obligations.⁹⁸

As Marxism spread in Vietnam, it molded itself to the cultural mindset of those it sought to convert. This process was so thorough that it eventually became difficult to separate Marxist-Leninist ideas from traditional Vietnamese ideas.⁹⁹ But more importantly, at least in terms of this study, the Communists used the similarities between Marxism and traditional thought to shape their propaganda for greatest effect. Propagandists drew symbols from Vietnam's history, religion, and philosophy, bent the meanings to support Marxist goals, and invoked them time and

again to channel the nation's intense nationalism. Any Communist use of force became "*tu ve*" (self defense), a deeply rooted theme in Vietnamese culture. "*Chinh nghĩa*," the Confucian concept of "just cause," became the essence of resistance against the French and later, the Americans. From Taoism they borrowed "*thoi co*," the idea of sensing the "opportune moment" for a turning of events, imparting an almost mystic significance to timing in the new dogma. But most importantly, "*dau tranh*," Vietnam's long, historical struggle for independence, exclusively came to mean Marxism's struggle to free the country from neo-colonial oppression.¹⁰⁰

In sum, North Vietnamese propaganda attempted to persuade its patrons by converting traditional themes in Vietnamese history into Marxist rhetoric. But in this translation, the messages reflect the insecurities and deceptions that had become ingrained in the Vietnamese national psyche. Centuries of foreign domination, a Confucian emphasis on hierarchical authority, and decades of French arrogance engendered a profound sensitivity to status in Vietnamese propagandists and audiences alike. Consequently, esteem and self-glorification were more important (to senders and receivers) than practical results when issues of power and hierarchy were at stake, and messages could not report failure at any level, political or military, tactical or strategic.¹⁰¹ This combination of cultural factors makes analyzing North Vietnamese propaganda a difficult undertaking, one which the George Methodology cannot accomplish without modification.


ANALYZING NORTH VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA

The George Methodology relies on the ability of analysts to discern the propagandist's strategy and then infer generalizations about the enemy elite's policies and perceptions. To succeed, the analyst must correctly interpret each message the propagandist sends--understand what he is trying to communicate to his intended target--and adopt the propagandist's frame of reference to determine the motives for sending the message. This work is done to identify the intervening variables between situational factor and message content as the analyst works to


reconstruct the action schema. So how much of George's methodology must we change to interpret and analyze North Vietnamese messages correctly?

The action schema that George identified in the FCC effort is suitable for analyzing DRV propaganda. The seven antecedent variables objectively depict the functional linkage of political leadership to propaganda strategy in a totalitarian regime. Since that linkage is static and does not in itself determine the interpretation of any information passing through it, it is not sensitive to cultural or ideological variations.¹⁰² Therefore, the schema is as appropriate for analyzing North Vietnamese communications as it was for analyzing German messages. The problems arise when we examine methods for interpreting the messages themselves--the direct and indirect method schemata.

The direct method schema is used to extract and tabulate data from message contents and is, therefore, somewhat sensitive to differences in propagandists' culture and ideology. When analysts apply the direct method, they examine the contents of messages and attempt to construct factual details about objective situations. Since they bypass behavior variables (those regarding the propagandist's strategy) and move directly to elite calculations and situational factors, this method is less sensitive to cultural variations than is the indirect method. However, analysts also use this method to hypothesize about the enemy elite's estimates, expectations, and intentions regarding those situations. If they are not oriented to the enemy's cultural and ideological frames reference, their hypotheses will be skewed to reflect impressions based on their own biases. Therefore, when examining communications from a propagandist with a cultural or ideological orientation as dramatically different as the DRV's, the direct method schema must be modified to adjust for the enemy's frame of reference. Figure 4 depicts a modified direct method schema in which a "cultural and ideological lens" is inserted to remind analysts that they must translate their perceptions about message contents into the enemy's frame of reference before they attempt to hypothesize the elite's estimates, expectations, or intentions.



The indirect method of propaganda analysis is the most sensitive to variations in the enemy's culture and ideology. Since it relies on a sequence of inferences in which the analyst applies logic-of-the-situation to derive information about each variable, it is particularly prone to skewed deductions if the analyst is unable to adopt the enemy's frame of reference. Therefore, a cultural and ideological lens similar to the one used to modify the direct schema must be inserted at each step in the indirect schema where a major generalization occurs. Figure 5 depicts the modified indirect action schema.



Whether using the direct or indirect method of analysis, employing each cultural and ideological lens is a subjective and somewhat intuitive process. Therefore, doing it well depends not only on the analyst's depth of knowledge about the adversary's culture and ideology but also on the analyst's ability to achieve what Ken Booth calls "cultural relativism."¹⁰³ Cultural relativism is the opposite of ethnocentrism. It involves not being culture bound or biased toward an imagined superiority of one's own culture. An analyst who can embrace cultural relativism is

one who can step out of the mindset of his own society and into that of his adversary's. Not only does he put aside the rational biases and values familiar to his own culture, he assumes those of his subject, seeing the world as his adversary would, complete with his adversary's cultural and ideological biases.

In conclusion, to analyze propaganda produced or orchestrated by the DRV properly, analysts must attain a state of cultural relativity--they must adopt the Vietnamese cultural and ideological frame of reference to discern the mindset of the propagandist and his elite masters. In short, the analyst's ability to empathize with the propagandist must become second nature.

The next chapter applies these modified schemata to determine what North Vietnamese propaganda revealed about the effects of Rolling Thunder and Linebacker operations on the political behavior of the DRV.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA

During America's involvement in the Vietnam War, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) produced a huge volume of propaganda and directed the production of even more by supporters in South Vietnam. These communications targeted a variety of audiences, at home and abroad, with objectives established and orchestrated by political leaders in North Vietnam. This chapter examines a representative sampling of that propaganda (see Table 5-1) generated during the Rolling Thunder, Linebacker, and Linebacker II air campaigns to measure how effective those efforts were in compelling DRV leaders to change their political behavior. The analysis determines that airpower was ineffective in compelling the DRV to stop supporting the Vietcong during Rolling Thunder, but the two Linebacker operations played a key role in coercing North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war.

The chapter begins with a general overview of the types of propaganda statements examined. It explains the nature of DRV-directed internal and external communications, and it profiles the numbers and types of statements, the dates they were released, and the media in which they were communicated. The chapter next analyzes propaganda statements made during each of the three bombing campaigns. In each case, the examination begins with the direct method of analysis, extracting factual data and forming hypotheses. Then it turns to indirect analysis, moving from message contents to situational factors and sequentially developing generalizations about the propagandists' strategies as well as policies and perceptions of North Vietnam's political elites. The product of this study is a composite picture of North Vietnamese policy, which remained stable during Operation Rolling Thunder but bent under pressure during the two Linebacker campaigns.

PROPAGANDA DATA PROFILE

This study examines 79 documents totaling more than 600 pages. The materials are divided into two categories: external and internal communications. External communications are those the propagandist produced principally, and usually exclusively, for the purpose of propagandizing both in

Vietnam and abroad. These items include translations of North Vietnamese newspaper and magazine articles, radio broadcasts, speeches, and excerpts from books written by prominent party officials. External communications may also include documents usually categorized as "internal," such as personal letters or private reports, if the propagandist chose to publish or broadcast their contents for propaganda purposes. Conversely, internal communications are those the North Vietnamese or their supporters chose not to release to individuals outside the party network. They were often classified "secret," top secret," or "absolute secret" by the Communists and include such items as party directives, indoctrination and reorientation materials, official military and political assessments, and even military operational communications. Internal communications were usually obtained from documents captured on the battlefield.¹⁰⁴

Although internal communications are obviously valuable as intelligence sources, one might ask why they are included in a propaganda analysis. There are several reasons. Training materials for indoctrination and reorientation were little more than "canned" propaganda, designed and usually produced in North Vietnam.¹⁰⁵ But other kinds of official communications were propaganda-oriented as well. Due to the often-strained relations between the North Vietnamese and their Vietcong clients, Northern leaders believed they needed to constantly re-motivate their Southern "Brothers."¹⁰⁶ Consequently, instructions emanating from the North were usually layered with anti-imperialist invective and political persuasion in persistent efforts to inflame and channel Southern nationalism. Cadres diligently assured these attributes appeared in Vietcong communications, keeping them closely tied to Northern propaganda strategies. Furthermore, due to the catalytic effect Marxism had on Vietnamese cultural tendencies toward insecurity and self-deception, nearly all Communist communications, even official plans and directives, included lengthy passages in which superiors indoctrinated their subordinates on official party positions. Exaggerating past victories, extolling the righteousness of their cause, and vilifying the enemy, the rhetoric in these sections is clearly propaganda. The tone and content of a top-secret Vietcong "Plan of General Uprising When a Political Settlement is Reached," published 4 October 1972, typify this approach:

The U.S. imperialists, shamefully defeated, have to withdraw troops, end the war of aggression, end their military involvement in Vietnam, causing the puppet troops to lose their support, become confused and come to the verge of collapse. After cease-fire, the

puppet troops, although still numerous and fully armed, cannot resort to force as before, this is a once-in-a-thousand-years opportunity for our people to stand up to topple the clique of country-selling lackeys in order to gain freedom, happiness, and a better life for ourselves.¹⁰⁷

The availability of selected internal communications significantly enhances any study of North Vietnamese propaganda. Ever since the birth of the People's Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese Army or "PAVN") in 1945 as a group of "armed propaganda teams," proselytizing has been a key military mission.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, nearly all Communist military plans and directives for South Vietnam included lengthy instructions for producing and disseminating propaganda materials to reorient "liberated" citizens.¹⁰⁹ Since these instructions are internal directives, they can be taken as true elaborations of propaganda strategy, extracted in direct analysis, and immediately applied to indirect analysis of subsequent internal and external communications. This invaluable source relieves the analyst from having to rely on inference alone to determine the enemy's propaganda strategy and occasionally eliminates the need to obtain and evaluate external propaganda to infer policies and perceptions of the Northern elite.

In this study, 47 of the propaganda samples are drawn from external communications, and 32 are from internal sources. Table 5-1 profiles the propaganda evaluated in this study in terms of medium (newspaper, radio, etc.) and channel (external or internal) for each of the time periods examined. Appendix I provides a more thorough profile of individual items.

Table 5-1--Propaganda Data Profile

PERIOD	Medium					Channel		Total
	Radio	Newspaper	Magazine	Document	Other	Internal	External	
Pre-RT				2	1	2	1	3
RThunder	8	6	5	14	4	14	23	37
'69 - '72	10	1		7	1	7	12	19
LB-I	4	1	1	9		8	6	14
LB-II	5			1		1	5	6
Total	27	8	6	32	6	32	47	79

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS--ROLLING THUNDER

This section evaluates 40 propaganda items produced during Rolling Thunder operations.¹¹⁰ The analysis concludes that Rolling Thunder did not compel the DRV to stop supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam.

Direct Analysis

Communist propaganda examined during the Rolling Thunder era exhibits a remarkable degree of consistency and firmness. While North Vietnamese officials before the war expressed pride in their growing industrial capabilities and concern that the U.S. might bomb them, their internal and external communications early in the campaign made relatively few references to bombing in the North. Instead, attention focused on the struggle in South Vietnam. As the period progressed, the DRV elite refused to negotiate and added a U.S. bombing halt to their demands that America remove all military forces from South Vietnam and terminate support for the Southern regime. By mid 1967, North Vietnamese propaganda began to focus more attention on Rolling Thunder, suggesting that Northern concern about the bombing may have increased. However, despite some American opinions in late 1967 that Rolling Thunder was making it impossible for the DRV to mount sizable operations against South Vietnam, North Vietnamese internal propaganda then and in early 1968 asserted the time had arrived to achieve victory over the U.S. and its allies. Propaganda in 1968 claimed that the Tet Offensive had been victorious,

tactically and strategically, and that the termination of bombing north of the 19th parallel was an admission of U.S. defeat.

In a 1962 interview with Asian expert and journalist, Bernard Fall, DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong announced that the Communist Party Central Committee had decided to emphasize heavy industries in keeping with the Marxist economic viewpoint that industrial development was essential to socialist construction. When Fall raised the possibility that North Vietnam's support of guerrilla warfare in the South might provoke the U.S. to bomb those industries, Pham denied the DRV supported the southern insurgency and insisted it would do nothing to "provoke a situation in the course of which they [the U.S.] could use the heroic struggle of the South Vietnamese people as a pretext for the destruction of North Vietnam's cultural and economic achievements."¹¹¹

Although the U.S. launched Rolling Thunder in March 1965, North Vietnam's public response throughout most of that year was limited to a few brief but defiant references amid numerous communications that focused on castigating American operations in South Vietnam. On 8 April, Pham Van Dong announced "four points" that were the DRV's pre-conditions for negotiating a political solution to the Vietnam problem. They included withdrawal of U.S. troops and support for South Vietnam; the termination of all foreign military alliances and involvements in Vietnam; settlement of South Vietnamese affairs in accordance with the Vietcong "program;" and a peaceful reunification of Vietnam carried out by people in both zones without foreign interference.¹¹² It is interesting to note that although Rolling Thunder had begun the month before, none of Pham's conditions directly addressed U.S. air operations.

In mid 1965, the DRV added the demand for a bombing halt to their pre-conditions for negotiation; however, North Vietnamese external communications throughout 1965 and 1966 continued to reflect the same general pattern and tone with few references to bombing in the North. Propaganda tailored for foreign audiences was typified by Ho Chi Minh's remarks in an April 1966 interview with Japan's NDN TV. The interviewer's question about the nature of the war brought a brief reference to Rolling Thunder: "In North Vietnam, the U.S. air attacks have also been defeated. Up to March 8, 1966, the North Vietnam army and people have downed over 900 U.S. planes."¹¹³ But then he quickly moved on to condemnations of alleged U.S. intentions to expand the ground war into Laos and Cambodia and ridicule of President

Lyndon Johnson's recent Honolulu Conference and peace proposals. Predictably, Ho's principal objective in this interview was to encourage the Japanese to oppose American use of Japan as a logistical and staging base. Later that month, when Ho addressed the DRV national assembly, he opened his speech with an indignant account of how the "U.S. aggressors [had] recklessly thrown into that battlefield [South Vietnam] 250,000 expeditionary troops of the U.S. and its satellites to frantically step up, together with the puppet army, their war of aggression."¹¹⁴ He carried on at length with descriptions of allied barbarism in South Vietnam, then transferred to a soliloquy lauding the bravery and heroism of the Vietcong. Buried in the text of Ho's speech was the brief mention that for a year the "U.S. imperialists [had] recklessly extended their aerial war of destruction to North Vietnam," and he commended the heroism of North Vietnamese defenders.¹¹⁵ But the overwhelming focus of this address was on the war in the South.¹¹⁶

External propaganda aimed at Vietnamese audiences, North and South, focused on the same themes but began to take more notice of air operations against the North in 1967. North Vietnam's foreign minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, stated the following in an article published in the April 1967 issue of the Communist Party's theoretical journal, *Hoc Tap* (Study):

The U.S. imperialists have demanded that we "negotiate unconditionally." The other reactionary cliques have also echoed this demand and called for "negotiations without preconditions." This means that they demand that we accept peace at any price and surrender ... If the Americans really want peace in Vietnam, the U.S. Administration must recognize our four-point stand and prove this through actual deeds. Only then is it possible to consider a political solution for the Vietnamese problem. If not, all arguments about peace with such tricks as bartering "unconditional cessation of the bombings against the North" for "unconditional negotiations" will only increase the anger of the Vietnamese people and progressive people the world over, the contemptible face of the Americans will be laid bare, and the Americans will be more isolated politically...¹¹⁷

In June 1967, Hanoi's *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* published a 17-page article by General Van Tien Dung that discussed Rolling Thunder operations at length. Hanoi's Domestic Services also broadcast this piece to South Vietnam on 13-14 June. Dung began by charging the U.S. with taking "ever more serious escalation steps in the war of destruction."¹¹⁸ And he conceded that:

The might of the U.S. Air Force lies in the fact that it has many planes, modern technical means, bombs and bullets, and available airfields in Thailand and South Vietnam, and at sea. It can attack from many directions, on many targets, under different weather conditions, by day and by night.¹¹⁹

But Dung did not dwell on the strength of U.S. airpower in this article, nor did he admit any negative effects the bombing might have had on North Vietnam's capability or will to continue the war. Instead, Dung proudly boasted, "We [the DRV] have foiled the basic U.S. scheme of using bombs and bullets to shake our people's determination to resist... [and have] frustrated the U.S. plot of using the war of destruction against the North to prevent the Northern compatriots from giving aid to their kith-and-kin compatriots in the South."¹²⁰ In fact, the emphasis throughout this article was on how the "heroic people" of North Vietnam had defeated the air war at each level of escalation. Dung asserted: "The deceitful argument about the U.S. Air Force has been exposed: its strength has proved to be limited, and its tactics, techniques, and pilots can definitely be defeated."¹²¹

Pham Van Dong also acknowledged Rolling Thunder in his 31 August 1967 National Day Speech. But like Dung, his tone was not one of concern; it was one of defiance. After reiterating the DRV's "four-point-stand," Pham said:

The U.S. Government has brazenly unleashed a criminal war against the DRV, an independent and sovereign state, a socialist state. It must therefore definitively and unconditionally stop its bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, and respect its independence, sovereignty, and territory. That is the legitimate demand of the Vietnamese people and also an elementary requirement of international law.¹²²

North Vietnamese-directed internal communications provide a more refined picture of the DRV's insensitivity to bombing. In April 1966, North Vietnamese General Nguyen Van Vinh addressed the Vietcong's Central Office Congress on the topic of negotiations. Details of his speech were obtained in captured notes and made available to the press in March 1967. General Vinh said a number of countries were urging North Vietnam to negotiate with the U.S. However, the DRV's strategy was one of "fighting and negotiating." He explained:

In a war between a powerful country which waged aggression and a weak country, as long as we have not yet acquired strength, a situation where fighting and negotiating are conducted simultaneously does not exist. Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation where both sides are fighting indecisively. Then a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may emerge.¹²³

He further envisioned a three-stage struggle in which the "fighting stage" would lead to the "stage of fighting while negotiating," and finally the "[stage of] negotiations and signing of agreements." As was

true in most of the DRV's more public communications, Vinh did not address air operations in this discussion about when to begin negotiations--pressure from Rolling Thunder does not appear to be a factor in North Vietnam's decision calculus.¹²⁴

In July 1967, the U.S. 199th Light Infantry Brigade captured a detailed set of notes taken by a Vietcong soldier at a high-level reorientation course he had attended in May. The views expressed at the course were consistent with those General Vinh briefed in 1966. The notes discussed North Vietnamese concern about friction between the Soviets and Chinese and stated that the Soviets were encouraging the DRV to negotiate but the Chinese did not think the time was right. The notes reiterated the overall "fighting-and-negotiating" strategy and compared the allied "two-pronged" strategy of military and pacification campaigns to the Communist leadership's "three-pronged-attack--military action, political offensive, and proselytizing within the enemy ranks."¹²⁵ Apparently, the reorientation course briefly mentioned Rolling Thunder, but only in reference to the Cultural Revolution ongoing in China:

Does this situation [the Cultural Revolution] influence the revolution in Vietnam? No. ... However, this political crisis has affected us in that it resulted in the U.S. escalating the air war in North Vietnam. Because the U.S. thought China was weak, they escalated the air war. But the more the U.S. escalates the war of destruction in North Vietnam, the more China will help us.¹²⁶

As early as August 1967, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong began political training in preparation for the 1968 Tet Offensive. To spur this effort they produced an indoctrination paper entitled, "The New Situation and Mission" and began circulating it in South Vietnam in various forms, including that of a religious tract. American forces obtained a copy in Tay Ninh Province on 25 November.¹²⁷ This 10-page internal propaganda piece trumpeted a supposed unbroken series of Communist victories. It cited immediate fighting objectives, assessed the current revolutionary situation, and expounded on the urgent political tasks for the party, people, and army of South Vietnam. Its situational evaluation focused on Communist military and political progress in the South, but it added:

In the North, they [the U.S.] have stepped up the destructive activities of their air force and navy, hoping to be able to intimidate our people and hamper Northern aid to the South. However, our army and people are not shaken. On the contrary, they are fighting bravely and have destroyed more than 2,000 American aircraft, and they are increasingly united in order to support the revolution in the South.¹²⁸

Although the "new situation" piece was careful not to compromise specific plans for the upcoming offensive, it confidently stated:¹²⁹

A perfect opportunity exists for us to push our attacks forward against the enemy in all fields and take advantage of the victories so that the South Vietnamese revolution can make a new great leap forward. We can say that the victories achieved in late 1967 and to be achieved in the coming year of 1968 will mark an important historical period for us. In this historical period, if our entire Party, army, and population fully understand the situation and surge forward to fight without any fear of hardship or sacrifice, then we will create a shift in the balance of forces between us and the enemy which will cause the U.S. aggressive limited war to go bankrupt and come to an end. From that situation, we can proceed toward realizing our immediate objectives and secure a complete victory.¹³⁰

It is important to note that during this period, most key American military leaders believed Rolling Thunder had made it impossible for North Vietnam to support a major offensive.¹³¹ However, this paper stated that U.S. air operations had not hampered aid to the South. While that declaration could have been bluster, the paper did not advise hoarding supplies or preparing to fight under austere logistical conditions. The indoctrination focused on inflaming readers' *will* to engage in a pitched battle but seemed to assume that the *capability* to do so was beyond question.¹³²

In the immediate aftermath of Tet and President Johnson's 31 March 1968 announcement that he would stop bombing the North Vietnamese heartland, U.S. troops captured Communist indoctrination materials that told cadres how they should view those events. Several basic themes were common in the documents.¹³³ First, they stressed the tactical successes of the recent offensive and asserted the bombing halt was proof that Johnson had finally acknowledged the war was lost. They also explained that, in keeping with the "fighting-and-negotiating" strategy, the DRV could now enter negotiations with the U.S. as the war had entered a new phase subsequent to the recent victories. However, the training materials warned troops not to "entertain peace illusions but to struggle more urgently and more positively."¹³⁴ They further stressed that peace would be won on the battlefield, not at the conference table. As one document expressed, "no agreement can be reached as long as we fail to win on the battlefield ... the other forms of struggle have only a supporting role.... We attack to negotiate and we negotiate to attack."¹³⁵

We can draw several hypotheses from the direct analysis of DRV-controlled propaganda during this period. In 1962, North Vietnamese leaders appeared to value their budding industrial establishment

and were genuinely concerned that U.S. airpower could threaten it. Yet the onset of Rolling Thunder generated a relatively subdued response compared to the DRV's reactions to U.S. escalation on the ground in South Vietnam. This reaction suggests North Vietnamese leaders had anticipated the costs of bombing and, weighing those costs against their desired goals in South Vietnam, decided to pay the price. Subsequent internal and external propaganda throughout the period suggests the DRV decision calculus remained unaffected by bombing in North Vietnam. Throughout 1967, propaganda provided considerable evidence that Rolling Thunder was not only failing to break the DRV's will to continue the war, but also failing to impede its capability to conduct military operations in South Vietnam. Internal communications captured following Johnson's March 1968 decision to limit bombing revealed the DRV believed that it had won a victory and suggested they would attempt to manipulate the forthcoming negotiations to their advantage.

Indirect Analysis

The indirect method of analysis provides significant insights into North Vietnamese propaganda strategies during Operation Rolling Thunder. These insights, in turn, reveal a great deal of information about the policies and perceptions of the DRV political elite. Indirect analysis tends to confirm the hypotheses drawn in direct analysis concerning North Vietnam's insensitivity to bombing. Not only did DRV leaders anticipate and deliberately bear the costs of Rolling Thunder, they also developed a strategy in which bombing became a benchmark of American resolve, and American resolve a pivotal factor in their calculation of the overall balance of forces.

The George Methodology of indirect analysis begins by defining the adversary's propaganda strategy in general terms. North Vietnamese communications during Rolling Thunder depicted the war as a struggle between a peace-loving Vietnamese people and an aggressive superpower desperately grappling to maintain its neocolonial empire through satellite troops, puppets, and its own brute force. From this basic stance, the DRV rationally denied the legitimacy of any regime in Saigon and held the Vietcong to be the true representatives of the Southern people. North Vietnamese officials also claimed they were not supporting the Southern insurgency with men, material, or leadership; they were only providing heroic

patriots moral support and encouragement. Therefore, when the U.S. began sustained bombing north of the 17th parallel, the DRV depicted it as an act of unprovoked and undeclared war. In sum, North Vietnamese used propaganda to construct a logical framework in which they painted all U.S. military operations against them and the Vietcong as criminal acts.

In propaganda aimed at foreign audiences, this foundation supported a concerted campaign to malign the U.S. and generate ever-increasing international and American domestic pressure to end military involvement and cut off support for Saigon. Hanoi's strategy was clearly reflected in this passage from Ho Chi Minh's letter to Pope Paul, released by the Vietnam News Agency (VNA) International Service on 13 February 1967:

Our people sincerely love peace in order to build our country in independence and freedom. However, the U.S. imperialists have sent to South Vietnam half a million U.S. and satellite troops and used more than 600,000 puppet troops to wage a war against our people. They have committed monstrous crimes. They have used the most barbarous arms, such as napalm, chemical products, and toxic gases, to massacre our compatriots and burn down our villages, pagodas, churches, hospitals, schools... [ellipses as transmitted] Their acts of aggression have grossly violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and seriously menaced peace in Asia and the world.¹³⁶

Most of these same accusations also appeared in propaganda tailored for Vietnamese audiences, but the focus was somewhat different. In that arena, Hanoi's objective was to meld the Communist cause with the historic struggle for nationalism and independence. From the viewpoint they created, American actions became synonymous with those of the French, Japanese, Chinese, and Mongols. The Saigon government and their representatives were equated with those who collaborated with the Japanese and the mandarins who served the French and Chinese in previous centuries. North Vietnamese domestic propaganda repeatedly resurrected past heroes, celebrating their courageous deeds and comparing them to Vietcong "freedom fighters." In the Marxist construction, to resist the U.S. and its allies was heroic; to abstain was to be less than Vietnamese; to collaborate was monstrous. This passage from Le Duan's November 1967 *Nhan Dan* article and radio broadcast typifies North Vietnamese domestic propaganda:

Fighting under the glorious banner of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and at the forefront for the defense of their motherland, our staunch and heroic compatriots in the south continue writing the most brilliant pages of our national history. The process of the South Vietnamese revolution is one of uniting, organizing, and developing all revolutionary and patriotic forces to smash the American imperialists'

aggression and the puppet ruling clique so as to liberate the south, defend the north, reunify the motherland, safeguard the independence and peace in Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the world. ... To this end, there is no other way than to use revolutionary violence to oppose the brute and cynical violence of the American imperialists and their henchmen.¹³⁷

Given this understanding of the DRV's propaganda strategy, the indirect method schema then leads us to generalize about its leadership's intentions, expectations, and estimates--in other words, their policies and perceptions. As expected, North Vietnam's propaganda strategy reflected the policies and perceptions of the DRV's ruling elite. Direct analysis of internal propaganda documents surfaced several references to a strategy of "three-pronged-attack," referring to military operations, political maneuvers, and proselytizing activities.¹³⁸ Indirect analysis of the DRV's propaganda effort seems to confirm this depiction of their overall strategic approach. Their propaganda aimed at foreign audiences was a well-orchestrated campaign to achieve North Vietnam's goals on the political front. It strove to isolate the U.S. internationally and make it increasingly difficult for America to continue the war in the face of growing domestic opposition. Dung's 1967 article hints of this stratagem when it stated: "Given their [the Americans'] political isolation and the present balance of international forces, the U.S. Air Force is compelled to escalate step by step, and cannot attack the North massively and swiftly in strategic, large-scale, surprise bombings."¹³⁹ Meanwhile, their presentation of the Communist cause as a continuation of the national struggle against foreign oppression supported strategic objectives of proselytizing in South Vietnam both to strengthen their forces and subvert those of the Saigon government. Both efforts contributed to the effectiveness of their military operations; isolating and neutralizing the U.S. reduced its ability to oppose the DRV, and the persistent proselytizing steadily weakened the South's ability to resist Northern and Vietcong aggression.

Indirect analysis also confirms the factual nature of the "fighting-and-negotiating" tactics frequently referenced in Communist internal propaganda.¹⁴⁰ North Vietnam's external propaganda messages repeatedly stressed the DRV would not negotiate with the U.S. until America accepted their "four-point stand" as the basis for discussion.¹⁴¹ However, acceptance of North Vietnam's four points would have required the U.S. to unconditionally withdraw from Vietnam, abandon the Saigon regime, and recognize the Vietcong as the legitimate government in South Vietnam. Since that would have been a de

facto surrender of all U.S. positions, something Hanoi knew was unacceptable, the DRV was actually saying they would not negotiate while cloaking their intransigence in noble-sounding terms designed to lay an onus of guilt on the Americans. That tact was consistent with General Vinh's March 1967 explanation of Phase I of North Vietnam's "fighting-and-negotiating" strategy. The DRV would not negotiate from a position of weakness. They would only move to Phase II, "fighting while negotiating," after the "comparative balance of forces" shifted to a situation in which neither side could gain a decisive advantage.¹⁴² Ironically, they altered that policy in 1968, and that change provides insights into the perceptions of North Vietnam's leaders.

Following the Tet Offensive and President Johnson's 31 March 1968 announcement that the U.S. would limit Rolling Thunder, the DRV agreed to open peace negotiations. As revealed in direct analysis, their internal propaganda hailed Tet and Johnson's sudden loss of determination as great victories but reminded cadres that negotiations did not signal an end to the war. But Tet was not a military victory for the Communists--it was a catastrophic defeat that destroyed the combat effectiveness of the Vietcong.¹⁴³ Therefore, the comparative balance of forces did not shift to their advantage; it shifted against them, and the DRV's decision to negotiate, therefore, signaled a significant change in policy.

Indirect analysis suggests this change surprised the cadre and Vietcong. It also suggests the Northern elite were concerned about the consequences of that surprise on the Vietcong's fighting spirit. These conclusions are derived from the absence of "anticipatory propaganda" before the decision to negotiate was announced as well as the almost panicked way in which propagandists attempted to explain the policy change afterward.¹⁴⁴ Intelligence analysts noted in mid 1968 that the DRV's internal propaganda gave subordinates no warning before 31 March that elites were about to change their long-held stance against negotiating with the U.S. As a result of Johnson's sudden announcement and the losses suffered in Tet, North Vietnamese elites became anxious that the morale of their troops might falter and they might gladly accept the possibilities of peace that negotiations suggested.¹⁴⁵ That fear explains the re-emphasis in late spring of the "fighting-while-negotiating" paradigm and the dogmatic insistence that Tet was a tactical and strategic victory.¹⁴⁶ But it still does not explain why the North Vietnamese suddenly decided to negotiate and what role, if any, airpower played in that decision.

To evaluate this change in policy one must consider several factors. First, Rolling Thunder did not compel North Vietnamese leaders to negotiate. They had already suffered three years of bombing, and even at the height of Rolling Thunder, Ho Chi Minh had proclaimed:

...they can use thousands of aircraft to intensify the war of destruction against North Vietnam, but they cannot shake our heroic Vietnamese peoples' iron will and determination to struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation. The more aggressive they are, the more serious their crimes. The war may last for another five, ten, twenty years or longer, and Hanoi, Haiphong, and a number of industrial cities may be demolished, but the Vietnamese people will remain unafraid.¹⁴⁷

Nor did Johnson's 31 March declaration encouraged Hanoi to negotiate any more than bombing pauses had in the past. Van Tien Dung revealed the DRV's interpretation of such actions in his June 1967 article (referenced in direct analysis):

Recently, the enemy at times has de-escalated, and in the future he may at times de-escalate, and he has also stopped the bombing at various periods. This is due to many causes. Because he has been painfully defeated, the enemy has been forced to renounce a number of his offensive plans... because he has suffered heavy losses in aircraft and pilots, and because he is short on bombs and bullets, the enemy's offensive capability has been limited... However, this is just a temporary phenomenon... We must never slacken our vigilance, and we must combat all illusions and tendencies to take temporary action and adopt a wait-and-see attitude, and we must protect and strengthen our forces, including all our armed forces and people's forces in the combat, production, and way-of-life fields, in order to conduct a protracted fight.¹⁴⁸

We can also deduce that the military defeat the Communists experienced in Tet did not coerce the DRV to negotiate. Agreeing to talks did nothing to reduce the pain or costs they suffered in that setback, and, given the tenets of their "fighting-and-negotiating" strategy, it was unreasonable for them to expect to gain anything at the table that they could not take in battle. However, agreeing to negotiate immediately following a military setback was a notable departure from a key pillar of that strategy--they were beginning talks not from a position of strength but one of weakness--and that signaled a change in policy. This shift in policy indicates that North Vietnamese leaders perceived a change in the strategic situation, one suggesting that negotiating with the U.S., or at least appearing to negotiate, might bring them the fruits of their strategy more quickly than continued intransigence.

Propaganda analysis suggests that President Johnson's decision to stop bombing North Vietnam signaled DRV leaders that U.S. resolve had finally broken.¹⁴⁹ Throughout Rolling Thunder, while the

U.S. tried to coerce North Vietnam to stop its aggression against South Vietnam, the DRV, through the international propaganda barb of its "three-pronged-strategy," attempted to compel the U.S. to end its support of Saigon. Washington bombed, escalated, and paused, but Hanoi had already appraised the cost of its resistance and weighed that price favorably against the potential benefits of breaking U.S. resolve. Consequently, the more the U.S. pressed and offered to negotiate, the more the DRV protested to the world and sanctimoniously held to its "four-point stand." At the end of March 1968, DRV leaders were confirmed in their belief that North Vietnam could bear the costs of being bombed easier than the U.S. could bear the political costs of bombing, and their propaganda statements reflected that fact. The coercer had become the coerced.

After Johnson's announcement, the DRV's political elite suddenly realized that although they had suffered a severe military setback in Tet, they had finally reached the stage where "fighting-and-negotiating" would work to their advantage. Ever sensitive to both the political and military forms of *dau tranh* (struggle), Northern leaders realized a situation had finally emerged in which both sides were fighting indecisively. The U.S. and South Vietnamese held a clear advantage on the ground, but that advantage was counter-balanced by the damage done to U.S. resolve. Consequently, Hanoi saw its cause could then be best served by appearing to negotiate. The promise would raise false American hopes that the conflict would soon end, thereby further eroding American resolve, and it would provide favorable material for their unending propaganda campaign. In conclusion, propaganda analysis suggests that Rolling Thunder failed to coerce the DRV and became instead a barometer with which North Vietnam measured the effectiveness of its own coercion campaign.

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS--LINEBACKER

This section analyzes propaganda to determine the coercive effects of airpower during the two Linebacker campaigns. Although Linebacker operations occurred from May 1972 to January 1973, this study examines propaganda sampled from a much longer period. The 39 items evaluated were selected from communications between January 1969 and January 1973. The extended time period of the sample provides a better range of data to baseline and measure changes in DRV behavior than would a sampling of messages from the narrower period of actual Linebacker operations. Beginning the data evaluation in 1969 also provides continuity with generalizations made during the analysis of Rolling Thunder-era propaganda. The study concludes that Linebacker played a significant roll in compelling the DRV to enter serious peace negotiations and Linebacker II was instrumental in coercing Hanoi to resume negotiations and sign a settlement.

Direct Analysis

North Vietnamese-directed propaganda displays a dramatic shift in tone and content from 1969, the beginning of the period examined, to that issued shortly before January 1973. Propaganda at the beginning of the period continued the trends exhibited in mid 1968: proclamations of victory in the Tet Offensive, self-congratulations for having defeated the U.S. aerial "war of destruction" against the North, and reminders that the struggle for a united Vietnam was far from over. In 1969, South Vietnamese revolutionaries (Communists and other dissidents) formed a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and DRV propagandists flaunted it as the legitimate government in the South. Northern propagandists also devoted a considerable effort to publicizing the DRV's position in the Paris peace negotiations, which mirrored its earlier "four-point stand."

These trends continued into the spring of 1972 when North Vietnam began its Easter offensive; however, as DRV fortunes changed, so did the tone and content of its propaganda. In August, Hanoi newspapers complained bitterly that its Socialist allies had not forced the U.S. to end air operations against North. By September, propagandists were hinting that DRV negotiators in Paris were about to offer key concessions. And October brought a concerted campaign to persuade the U.S. to pressure South

Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu into accepting the draft peace agreement. When Linebacker II began in December, Northern propagandists reacted with a display of outrage that quickly took a tone of desperation as the bombing intensified.

Specific examples illustrate the above trends. In January 1969, DRV external propaganda reflected elation at having "defeated the cruel war of destruction" against North Vietnam and expressed great expectations of renewed economic development in the North and victory in the South. On 17 January, Radio Hanoi broadcast an article written by Nguyen Van Dai, Vice Chairman of North Vietnam's State Planning Commission, explaining the DRV's newly released 1969 State Plan. The article opened:

Heavily defeated and stalemated in both the south and the north, the imperialists had to unconditionally end the bombing and shelling of the northern part of our country. This constitutes a very great success of the brave struggle of our armed forces and people. Nonetheless, the U.S. imperialists remain very stubborn and crafty. In the face of the present situation, the sacred task of the northern armed forces and people is to increase their vigilance, to be ready to smash every new plot of the U.S. imperialists, to exert efforts to build and develop [the] economy, to strengthen our forces in all fields, and to vigorously develop the role of the vast rear base toward the heroic, vast front line.¹⁵⁰

Throughout the year, North Vietnam's external propaganda repeated those same themes, but statements also reflected efforts to exploit developments in the newest theater of operations--the Paris peace talks. On 8 May 1969, shortly after Politburo member Le Duc Tho arrived in Paris to "advise" North Vietnamese negotiators, Liberation Press Agency Radio announced that DRV representatives had just presented "the main content of the overall solution to the South Vietnam problem to help restore peace in Vietnam."¹⁵¹ What later became known as the "Ten-Point Overall Solution," or simply, the "Ten-Point Solution," would be North Vietnam's bargaining position well into 1972.

The "Ten-Point Solution" called for a return to Hanoi's interpretation of the 1954 Geneva Accords. It demanded an unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. and allied troops from South Vietnam and declared that "the question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves."¹⁵² It further called for the people of South Vietnam to settle their own affairs without foreign interference and demanded establishment of a provisional coalition government. This body would administer the country for some unspecified period until "free and democratic general elections" created a constituent assembly that would write a constitution and construct a

permanent coalition government.¹⁵³ Ironically, the text of the "Ten-Point Solution" readily admitted it was based on the Vietcong's August 1967 Political Program and was "in keeping with the Four-Point Stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam"; nonetheless, Hanoi's propagandists soon trumpeted the "Ten Point Solution" as the key to resolving the stalemated negotiations.¹⁵⁴

Seeking to maintain the momentum of this coordinated diplomatic-propaganda initiative, Liberation Radio and Press Agency announced on 10 June 1969 that a congress of representatives from the Vietcong Central Committee and the "Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces" had formed the PRG.¹⁵⁵ This body became a shadow government in South Vietnam, and DRV propagandists used every opportunity in their foreign and domestic communications to proclaim its importance. General Nguyen Giap, in a speech to the 3rd Military Sector Conference in July, paused in his lengthy diatribe about North Vietnam's military victories to say:

At the conference table, the NLFSV's [National Liberation Front for South Vietnam's] 10-point overall solution has driven the enemy into a passive, confused situation. The proclamation of the NLFSV's 10-point solution was followed by the emergence of the Republic of South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government which has won extensive international sympathy and support.¹⁵⁶

When Ho Chi Minh died in September, it was the PRG, acting in concert with the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the "Alliance," that released the news to Europe via Liberation Radio.¹⁵⁷ From that point until mid-1972, nearly all official announcements from Communists in South Vietnam were made under the combined auspices of the NLF (which included the Vietcong), the Alliance, and the PRG.

Propagandists kept up the combined Paris-Hanoi-PRG diplomatic offensive throughout 1970 and 1971. However, they began to exhibit a somewhat different tenor when the PRG released its "Ten Point Lenient and Humanitarian Policy" over Hanoi's Liberation Radio on 25 January 1972. The "Ten-Point Policy" was a plea for Southerners in all walks of life to stop cooperating with the Government of South Vietnam and, instead, support the "anti-U.S. national salvation struggle."¹⁵⁸ It promised praise and rewards to all soldiers, policemen, officials, and civilians who would desert the enemy ranks or, if necessary, remain in place but "maintain good relations with the people and the revolution, oppose their terrorist oppressors and cruel agents, not participate in terrorist raids, and oppose conscription."¹⁵⁹ The

"Ten-Point Policy" even promised clemency to individuals who had committed crimes against the revolution if they would repent and atone for their past deeds.¹⁶⁰ Surprising as it was, this shift in tone and approach was minor compared to the dramatic swings propagandists were to demonstrate later in 1972.

In the first weeks of the DRV's Easter Offensive, propaganda aimed at foreign audiences continued to press the diplomatic attack. Paris negotiators moved little from the "Ten-Point Solution" proposed two years earlier. The newest version of this old theme insisted that before a cease-fire could be considered, all pacification and "Vietnamization" activities had to stop and the Saigon government had to be dismantled and replaced with a transitional government that would negotiate a final settlement with the PRG.¹⁶¹ Although Le Duc Tho painted this proposal a bit differently when he explained it in a Paris press conference on 12 May, his words still reflected the intransigent tone of a government that believes it is negotiating from a position of strength:

...we have declared clearly that the DRV government and the PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam have never wished to force a Communist government on South Vietnam. We only want that there be in South Vietnam a national reconciliation government having three segments, supporting peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy. I can clarify for you what the three segments are: one segment belonging to the PRG, one belonging to the Saigon government, and one segment belonging to patriots supporting peace, independence, neutrality and democracy--people who do not like the U.S. but who also may not support the PRG. ... With regard to these three segments, the segment belonging to the Saigon government is chosen by themselves. They can choose whomever they wish, ... but it can't be Thieu.¹⁶²

As the summer progressed and North Vietnam's military situation worsened, DRV propagandists began to express frustration with their Socialist allies for not pressuring the U.S. to curtail its air offensive against Northern targets. On 17 August 1972, an editorial appeared in party newspaper, *Nhan Dan*, expressing a sense of betrayal that neither China nor the Soviet Union had made the mining of Haiphong Harbor or the bombing a major issue in their relations with the Nixon Administration.¹⁶³ The editorial proceeded to lecture the DRV's allies on the dangers of entering into *détente* with the U.S., for whom it "is but a perfidious policy aimed at carrying out schemes of aggression, enslavement, subversion, and peaceful regression through new means, that is, the 'Nixon doctrine.'"¹⁶⁴ The article closed by scolding China and the Soviet Union for engaging in *détente* "in order to serve [their] own narrow interests... [and making] a harmful compromise advantageous to the enemy, and disadvantageous to the revolution."¹⁶⁵

September brought the first indication from North Vietnamese propaganda that the DRV was about to soften its negotiating position. On the eleventh, Hanoi Radio broadcast a statement by the PRG in which it specified requirements that the U.S. must meet before a lasting peace could be found in Vietnam. The statement began with the usual litany of demands including an end to the air war, rapid withdrawal of all U.S. forces, an end to Vietnamization, and termination of support for the Thieu "stooge" administration.¹⁶⁶ However, it then proceeded to say, "a solution to the internal problem of South Vietnam must proceed from the actual situation that there exist in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and other political forces."¹⁶⁷ This statement was the first implication that the DRV was about to drop its insistence that the South Vietnamese government be replaced with a tripartite government, and it signaled that North Vietnam and the U.S. might soon reach an agreement. Unfortunately, the terms of that agreement would not be acceptable to South Vietnam and, consequently, the DRV's propaganda offensive was not yet over.

An agreement was not reached because the terms were unacceptable to President Thieu.¹⁶⁸ When, at his insistence, the U.S. attempted to re-negotiate provisions of the draft settlement, North Vietnamese propagandists launched a concerted campaign to persuade the U.S. to pressure Thieu into accepting the agreement as written. The campaign began with a 26 October broadcast on Hanoi Radio attempting to show American perfidy in the negotiating process. This report chronicled the history of the negotiations, cited details of the draft settlement, and exposed American efforts to delay signing the agreement to re-negotiate the provisions to which Thieu objected.¹⁶⁹ The statement concluded with the following:

The so-called difficulties in Saigon represent a mere pretext to delay the implementation of the U.S. commitments, because it is public knowledge that the Saigon administration has been rigged up and fostered by the United States. With a mercenary army equipped and paid by the United States, this administration is a tool for carrying out the "Vietnamization" policy and the neocolonialist policy of the United States in violation of the South Vietnamese people's national rights. It is an instrument for the United States to sabotage all peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem.¹⁷⁰

As the negotiating climate continued to deteriorate and each side submitted changes and counter-changes to the previous draft agreement, North Vietnam intensified its propaganda offensive. On 17

December 1972, in response to a press conference Henry Kissinger conducted the day before, Nguyen Thanh Le, the DRV spokesman at the "public" Paris negotiations, once again stated the North Vietnamese case.¹⁷¹

...the U.S. side has deliberately distorted the facts, claiming that the DRV side had demanded changes to many questions and that it had thus created obstacles to the conclusion of the agreement. That is completely untrue. ... The position of the DRV side is that the text of the agreement agreed upon on October 20, 1972, should be maintained. But if the U.S. side insists on changing it, our side will have also to propose necessary changes. The negotiations are prolonged, the war increases its violence, [and] the responsibility for such a situation befalls on the U.S. side.¹⁷²

That same day--the eve of Nixon's Linebacker II air offensive--Hanoi broadcast a lengthy statement in Vietnamese that exhibited a far more vehement tone. Among its charges, Hanoi said:

It is thus clear that the United States has not given up its design to perpetuate its neocolonialist rule of South Vietnam, that it is striving to carry out its plan to Vietnamize the war there while prompting Nguyen Van Thieu to resist signing the peace agreement and even to reject the essentials of this agreement. Whatever sophistry the United States may indulge in, it cannot avoid its responsibility for the present situation in the Vietnam peace talks.¹⁷³

Vehemence turned to outrage in an English broadcast reporting a statement made by PRG representative to the public Paris talks, Dinh Ba Thi, on 21 December 1972, three days after the start of Linebacker II. Thi strongly denounced the Nixon administration for escalating the war once again by bombing the North Vietnamese heartland, and he demanded the U.S. "put an immediate end to these criminal acts."¹⁷⁴ He went on to say:

The adventurous acts and war escalation of the United States will provoke due reposes and punishment from the entire Vietnamese people from the south to the north. The Vietnamese people want peace and independence and freedom. ... Should the United States stubbornly continue the "Vietnamization" policy in South Vietnam and the bombing, mining, and blockading of North Vietnam, it would have to bear all the serious consequences of these criminal acts.¹⁷⁵

On 27 December 1972, North Vietnamese propaganda turned to desperation following a night in which Hanoi and Haiphong underwent the most concentrated bombing of the war. In a statement by the foreign minister, broadcast in English by Vietnam News Agency, the DRV denounced the raids as "extermination bombings ... brutal acts aimed at massacring civilians, a crime that far exceeds in barbarity the ones perpetrated in the past by the Hitlerite fascists."¹⁷⁶ Grasping for emotive symbols, the statement

evoked images of "B-52s carpet-bombing densely populated areas," destroying thousands of houses, medical stations, and a hospital.¹⁷⁷ It appealed to U.S. service members and their families, telling them the Nixon administration is "threatening the lives and living conditions of hundreds of U.S. pilots being detained and further lengthening the list of captured U.S. military men."¹⁷⁸ Most significantly, it stabbed at America's sensitivity to its image on the world stage, insisting "the Nixon administration's international brigandage acts and policy to negotiate on a position of strength have aroused profound hatred among the Vietnamese people and high indignation among the world people."¹⁷⁹

Direct analysis of the foregoing material yields several hypotheses. Propaganda in the aftermath of Rolling Thunder continued the same themes that emerged in mid-1968: hailing the defeat of the U.S. aerial War of Destruction over North Vietnam and celebrating the "victories" of the Tet Offensive. As time passed, propagandists increasingly turned their attention to the Paris talks and publicizing the PRG. The consistency and persistence with which they hammered these themes suggest they played key roles in North Vietnam's strategy to overcome the military setback of Tet. The propaganda campaign played a key role in efforts to stall the U.S. in the diplomatic arena and revive strength in the South through increased proselytizing. However, on the eve of the Easter Offensive, Hanoi's broadcast of the PRG's pleading "Ten- Point Lenient and Humanitarian Policy" suggests these hopes were being frustrated. The Communists had become increasingly concerned about the growing success of Vietnamization.

Direct analysis of North Vietnamese propaganda during the remainder of 1972 leads us to hypothesize that airpower helped to compel positive behavioral changes in the DRV. Although resistant early in Operation Linebacker, North Vietnamese propaganda suggests the bombing began to make DRV leaders anxious by mid-summer. In subsequent months, propaganda signaled the DRV was about to soften its negotiating stance and later betrayed the urgency in which North Vietnam wanted the U.S. to sign the draft peace agreement. These signals suggest North Vietnam was chafing to stop the bombing and eager to assure it did not resume. Finally, the desperation reflected in DRV propaganda during Linebacker II suggests that campaign was instrumental in compelling North Vietnam to return to negotiations and sign an agreement.

Indirect Analysis

The indirect method of analysis reveals much about DRV propaganda strategies before and during the Linebacker campaigns. This information, then, enables us to profile the changing policies and perceptions of North Vietnam's political elite. Indirect analysis tends to confirm the hypotheses drawn in direct analysis concerning North Vietnam's political strategies before Linebacker and the coercive effects of U.S. airpower in 1972. Propaganda played a key role in a concerted diplomatic offensive and recruiting campaign the DRV began in early 1969. North Vietnamese leaders still continued this coordinated effort three years later during the early stages of the Easter Offensive, but as their military fortunes changed, so did the focus of their propaganda. As 1972 progressed, propaganda revealed that airpower helped compel Northern leaders to change their behavior. Ultimately, propaganda became the principal instrument with which the DRV tried unsuccessfully to compel the U.S. to end its final air offensive against North Vietnam.

The indirect method schema begins with reconstructing the adversary's propaganda strategy. After Rolling Thunder, DRV propagandists continued the same strategies that had already proven successful. They continued to depict the U.S. as a neocolonial, imperialist power struggling to maintain control of Vietnam through an illegitimate puppet regime in Saigon. However, having recently declared victory in Rolling Thunder and Tet, the North Vietnamese added new verses to this mantra. The DRV's propaganda strategy began to focus on convincing audiences that the U.S. was a clay-footed giant, defeated in the air war against North Vietnam and impotent on the ground in South Vietnam. Consequently, the U.S. was being forced to negotiate its way out of Southeast Asia, and all continued U.S. military operations there were merely spiteful lashes from a bitter and beaten foe.¹⁸⁰

As during Rolling Thunder, generalizations about the DRV's propaganda strategy in the following years enable us to infer the intentions of its political elites during that period. North Vietnam's propaganda remained an integral component of its national policy. Northern leaders continued their overall approach of the "three-pronged-attack," and much of their internal propaganda emphasized the need for fighting spirit and returning to the offensive.¹⁸¹ Nonetheless, propaganda themes beginning in 1969 suggest that DRV elites responded to the military setbacks sustained in early 1968 by focusing their main effort on the

political front, where they perceived the U.S. was on the defensive. They believed their bid to negotiate had gained them the diplomatic initiative. Attempting to exploit that advantage, they introduced the "Ten-Point Solution" in Paris and used it as a pretext to justify the PRG in South Vietnam. Propaganda fanfare accompanied both of these moves. Taken together, they suggest the DRV was proceeding with its "fighting and negotiating" tactic, using the Paris Talks to stall and further erode U.S. resolve, while the PRG-oriented propaganda offensive supported the "proselytizing" prong of its strategy in efforts to restore Communist strength in South Vietnam. All of these maneuvers were designed to defeat the U.S. "Vietnamization" program and return the Vietcong to a position where they could conduct effective military operations. Much to their disappointment, it did not work.

By 1972, Vietnamization had made significant strides and North Vietnamese propaganda began to signal changes in policy. January's "Ten-Point Lenient and Humanitarian Policy" exhibits a significant departure from Hanoi's heretofore bellicose tone. This sudden change in propaganda strategy requires us to return to the indirect schema and reassess the intentions, expectations, and estimates of the North Vietnamese political elites. Indirect analysis suggests this broadcast was an admission that the PRG-oriented proselytizing campaign was failing and a change in DRV strategy was imminent. Yet nothing in this message hinted that a major offensive was in the making.

North Vietnam's Easter Offensive was a dramatic re-emphasis of the military spike in its "three-pronged-attack" strategy. However, internal propaganda documents captured early in the offensive indicate political maneuver and proselytizing were still vitally important features in the DRV's overall plan.¹⁸² As noted in direct analysis, Le Duc Tho's statement in May reflected the intransigence of a government that did not need to negotiate because of victories on the battlefield. Indirect analysis of Tho's remarks and internal propaganda documents obtained in the spring and early summer suggest DRV elites deliberately stalled the U.S. in Paris because they believed they could achieve Saigon's overthrow through conventional military action and subversive proselytizing.¹⁸³ But as the summer progressed, their perceptions of the situation changed, and North Vietnamese propaganda began to reflect those changes. Using the indirect schema, we can examine each shift in propaganda strategy and infer the evolution in elite policy and perception that inspired it.

Indirect analysis of propaganda collected in August suggests the pressure of Linebacker had motivated North Vietnamese political leaders to appeal to China and the Soviet Union for help. The *Nhan Dan* article cited in direct analysis castigates the DRV's socialist allies for putting a higher value on *détente* with the U.S. than on the "revolution" in Vietnam. That charge suggests Hanoi had appealed for Moscow and Beijing to pressure the Americans to stop or restrict the air campaign and both refused. The vehemence expressed in the article, and the indication that Hanoi appealed to both its principal allies, betray a sense of urgency that suggests North Vietnamese elites perceived Linebacker was having considerable effect. These perceptions soon led them to change their policies and strategies.

Indirect analysis suggests the change in DRV political behavior that Linebacker was designed to compel first began in early September. As noted in direct analysis, Hanoi radio broadcast a PRG statement on the eleventh in which it recognized the existence of two "administrations" and armies in South Vietnam. Issued a few days before talks were to resume in Paris, the announcement was anticipatory propaganda intended to prepare audiences for a change in North Vietnam's negotiating policy. This message was North Vietnam's first public acceptance of the Saigon government, and its release indicated the DRV would soon drop its demand that the Thieu administration be dismantled before a settlement could be negotiated. Significantly, the draft agreement Le Duc Tho submitted on 8 October was very close to the position specified in the 8 September PRG statement, and it ultimately formed the basis of the first Paris Agreement.¹⁸⁴

These inferences all tend to confirm the hypothesis that pressure from Linebacker and heavy bombing in the South played a significant role in compelling DRV leaders to negotiate the October settlement. However, Hanoi's resistance to American efforts to alter provisions of the agreement later that month suggest that some change in situational factors led DRV elites to reassess their decision calculus. Perhaps they felt the changes the U.S. submitted were too significant to accept and believed the U.S. lacked the political resolve to resume bombing north of the 20th parallel. Perhaps they knew of President Nixon's desire to formalize a settlement before Congress convened in January and calculated the potential benefits of holding out warranted the costs a resumption in bombing could bring.¹⁸⁵ Whatever the reason,

the propaganda campaign North Vietnam launched in late October to persuade the U.S. to sign the draft agreement suggests a renewed insensitivity to coercion.

Indirect analysis of the propaganda generated throughout the rest of 1972 suggests North Vietnam initiated a propaganda-based coercion counter-offensive against the U.S. reminiscent of the one they conducted during the Rolling Thunder era. Their propaganda strategy in this offensive called for depicting the U.S. as a perfidious, double-dealing swindler who had tried to gain advantage by first signing a peace agreement, then having its stooge renege the contract and demand more concessions. Conversely, the DRV was shown as a prudent and honest victim, dealing in good faith in a valiant attempt to end a tragic war. This strategy was designed to support a policy aimed at focusing international and domestic pressure on the U.S. to accept the October settlement without change. North Vietnamese elites hoped to compel the U.S. to overrule Thieu and sign the agreement, thereby embarrassing Washington and discrediting Saigon while getting a settlement without further concessions.

When Linebacker II began, Hanoi intensified the campaign and resurrected many of the themes employed during Rolling Thunder. Once again they paraded America before the world as a brutal, imperialist aggressor who would one day answer for its criminal acts. And once again the DRV and the U.S. locked horns in contest of wills. The U.S. bombed to coerce North Vietnam to return to the table and re-negotiate the peace settlement; meanwhile the DRV cried in outrage, imploring the community of nations to compel the U.S. to end the bombing. But in December 1972, the tone of North Vietnam's protests was far different than it had been at any time during Rolling Thunder. Gone was most of the bellicose bravado that characterized statements such as this one transmitted in 1967, at the height of the earlier campaign:

At present, while the U.S. aggressors are attacking Hanoi and Haiphong and terrorizing our population centers, we must, in defiance of all hardships and sacrifices, heighten our iron determination to liberate the South and protect the North, reject all intimidation by force as well as the peace-negotiation tricks of the United States, and resolutely compel the bloodthirsty devils to pay their blood debts.¹⁸⁶

Instead, Hanoi focused on the pain Linebacker II was inflicting on North Vietnam, citing a litany of destruction, and called on the world to condemn the U.S. Many of the old themes could still be heard, such

as "let the U.S. imperialist aggressors harbor no illusion about subduing the heroic Vietnamese nation by the force of bombs and shells," and "the U.S. aggressors will certainly be duly punished for every step of their war escalation."¹⁸⁷ But these declarations rang hollow amid the cries of destruction and the repeated petitions for help from the international community. In 1967 DRV communications exhibited an unmistakable air of strength, confidence, and defiance. By the end of 1972, the propaganda conveyed a tone of desperation, a plaintive ring that betrayed the hopelessness in which Northern leaders appraised the situation. The statement by North Vietnam's foreign minister, broadcast in English on 27 December, closed with the following plea:

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people thank the governments and peoples of the other socialist countries, the governments and peoples of the peace- and justice-loving countries in the world, the various international organizations, and the American people for having timely and firmly condemned the Nixon administration's frenzied war acts. The DRV Government and the Vietnamese people earnestly call on their friends in all the five continents to continue to struggle in order to check the bloodstained hands of the U.S. imperialist aggressors, who are deliberately massacring civilians and exterminating towns and populous areas in the DRV, and to lend stronger support to the Vietnamese people's just cause till complete victory.¹⁸⁸

Indirect analysis suggests this is a statement from political leaders on the verge of yielding under the weight of coercive airpower. On 28 December 1972, Hanoi agreed to President Nixon's conditions for returning to negotiations.¹⁸⁹

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Throughout the Vietnam War, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) used political propaganda to manipulate the opinions of the people it controlled and others whom it wished to influence. Its propagandists used this powerful instrument of policy to fashion a world of their own design in the minds of their audiences, and they invoked that world time and again using historical and cultural symbols for their own purposes. This contrived world view posed a formidable challenge in deducing reliable intelligence from their communications. Nonetheless, this study suggests that a wealth of information could have been developed from the systematic analysis of North Vietnamese political propaganda.

Such propaganda analysis might have helped to measure airpower's effectiveness as a coercive instrument against North Vietnam. The methodology that Alexander George developed in 1959 for analyzing totalitarian propaganda proved a useful tool for measuring the behavioral changes of DRV leaders. Once modified to account for the cultural and ideological peculiarities of North Vietnamese thought, the George methodology provided essential schemata for extracting factual information from DRV communications and inferring the strategies, policies, perceptions, and intentions of Northern propagandists and their masters. This analysis consistently indicated that Operation Rolling Thunder was unsuccessful in compelling the DRV to stop supporting the insurgency against South Vietnam. Northern internal and external communications throughout the period suggest the DRV decision calculus remained insensitive to the effects of bombing. Conversely, when North Vietnam invaded the South with a massive conventional military force in 1972, propaganda analysis suggested that Operation Linebacker played a key role in coercing Northern leaders to negotiate a peace settlement. Likewise, inferences derived in propaganda analysis indicated that, when efforts to re-negotiate the agreement broke down in December 1972, Operation Linebacker II was instrumental in compelling the DRV to return to negotiations and end the war. Encouraging as these findings are, however, they must be considered in light of the limitations under which this study was conducted.

This study examined a very small number of propaganda messages, and that limitation restricted the scope and weight of its findings. For a thorough propaganda analysis, data should be collected and evaluated daily to discern trends and detect subtle changes in tone and strategy. This study examined only 78 statements made over a 10-year period. Such a sparse examination prohibits the kind of in-depth evaluation needed to verify that propaganda analysis can detect and interpret an adversary's behavioral changes in a *timely* manner. While the study did identify several instances in which the DRV's propaganda strategy rapidly changed to prepare for, or accommodate, shifts in elite policy (particularly during the Linebacker campaigns), insufficient data were available to verify that these indicators are consistently present. Consequently, this study did not confidently verify that propaganda analysis can provide information quickly enough to help adjust airpower strategy while a coercive air campaign is underway. Nonetheless, the results do attest that changes in an adversary's policies, perceptions, and strategies are revealed in propaganda, and they further suggest that, given adequate data, those factors could reliably be detected in a timely manner. More study is needed in this area.

This study further disclosed other limitations of propaganda-based intelligence collection. First, propaganda analysis cannot stand alone. It is heavily dependent on other sources of information, both to provide details about situational factors the propagandist may be addressing, and to guide the generalizations inferred in indirect analysis. Second, internal propaganda proved particularly important in this examination. Unfortunately, access to this information relies almost exclusively on captured documents, and the consistent availability of these sources cannot be guaranteed in future conflicts, especially if coercive airpower is used without a concurrent ground force employment. However, future studies may conclude that, given a greater volume of external propaganda, analysts are less dependent on internal documents. In any case, propaganda analysis does not appear to be a fruitful source for gathering detailed objective information such as bomb damage assessments, technical intelligence, or perishable data. While these items can usually be verified when they surface in propaganda, the irregularity in which they appear suggests that other forms of intelligence would be more productive for providing this information. Finally, the accuracy of inferences drawn in propaganda analysis depends in large measure on the analysts' skill and cultural understanding. Since the generalization processes employed in indirect analysis are both

subjective and intuitive in nature, the quality of the information derived rests on the analyst's ability to empathize with the propagandist and his masters. This skill may demand a thorough cultural and ideological education and innate talents not widely available.

Nonetheless, propaganda analysis can be a useful tool for gathering information about an adversary's perceptions and attitudes. And it is particularly well suited for measuring changes in his strategies, intentions, and expectations. Therefore, it should be considered an important supplementary source of intelligence for evaluating success in achieving broad political or military objectives, particularly when those objectives involve affecting an adversary's behavior, such as in coercion, deterrence, or psychological operations. In essence, propaganda analysis should be considered one leg of a broadly-based, interdependent, intelligence collection effort.

The Vietnam War was indeed a frustrating chapter in America's use of airpower in armed conflict. While this study did not examine why the coercion strategies employed there failed or succeeded, it does provide insight into how those efforts could have been evaluated while they were underway. The study shows that propaganda analysis could have helped measure airpower's effectiveness as a coercive instrument against the DRV, and it suggests those measurements *may* have been made rapidly enough to spur changes in strategy that would have made the employment of airpower more effective. In conclusion, propaganda analysis should be used to help evaluate the compellent effects of airpower in future coercion operations. Further study should be undertaken to determine the timeliness of the information propaganda analysis can provide.

APPENDIX I

EXPANDED DATA PROFILE

Date	Short Title	Description	Medium*	Chan	Language**
Jul 62	Talk with Ho Chi Minh	Interview: Ho & Pham	Book	E	French
2 Jan 65	Spring '65 Reorientation	Captured Party Directive	Document	I	Vietnamese
5 Mar 65	New Situation, New Tasks	Party Reorientation	Document	I	Vietnamese
8 Apr 65	Position on Negotiations	"Four-Point-Stand"	Radio	E	Vietnamese
15 Apr 65	U.S. Imperialists Get Out	Ho Speech to National Assembly	Newspaper	E	Vietnamese
6 Jul 65	We Will Certainly Win	Le Duan Speech to Cadre	Book	E	Vietnamese
15 Jul 65	Duty Defending the Heartland	Interview: Ho Chi Minh	Newspaper	E	Vietnamese
16 Dec 65	Let U.S. Imperialists Withdraw	Interview: Ho Chi Minh	Newspaper	E	Vietnamese
Apr 66	Fighting and Negotiating	Speech to COSVN Congress	Document	I	Vietnamese
21 Apr 66	Japanese NDN TV	Interview: Ho Chi Minh	TV	E	Japanese
28 Apr 66	People United as One Man	Ho Speech to National Assembly	Newspaper	E	Vietnamese
17 Jul 66	Fight Until Complete Victory	Ho Chi Minh Radio Address	Radio	E	Vietnamese
Nov 66	French Magazine <i>L'ev'nement</i>	Interview: Ho Chi Minh	Magazine	E	French
2 Nov 66	Honor of Cuban President	Ho Speech at Banquet	Book	E	Vietnamese
28 Jan 67	Fight Against U.S. Aggressors	Interview: Trinh to Burchett	Radio	E	Vietnamese
10 Feb 67	Reply to LBJ	Ho Chi Minh Letter	Radio	E	Vietnamese
13 Feb 67	Reply to Pope Paul	Ho Chi Minh Letter	Radio	E	Vietnamese
17 Feb 67	Wilson Initiatives	Editorial: Brit PM's Initiatives	Newspaper	E	Vietnamese
Mar 67	Central Committee Resolutions	Captured Le Duan Letter	Document	I	Vietnamese
Apr 67	"Four-Point" Reiteration	Trinh Article in <i>Hoc Tap</i>	Magazine	E	Vietnamese
3 Apr 67	U.N. Peace Proposal	<i>Nhan Dan</i> Commentary	Radio	E	Vietnamese
7 May 67	High-Level Reorientation	Captured Cadre Notes	Document	I	Vietnamese
2 Jul 67	No Negotiations Until U.S. Out	Intv: Trinh / <i>Vienna Volksstimme</i>	Magazine	E	German
Aug 67	Religious Problems	<i>Hoc Tap</i> Article	Magazine	E	Vietnamese
3 Aug 67	New Situation and Mission	Captured Reorient. Course Notes	Document	I	Vietnamese
2 Sep 67	"Four -Point" Reiteration	Pham National Day Speech	Radio	E	Vietnamese
26 Sep 67	U.S. UN Ambassador's Speech	VNA Radio Commentary	Radio	E	Vietnamese
1 Nov 67	Tet Directive	Captured Vietcong Directive	Document	I	Vietnamese
1 Nov 67	Guidelines for Indoctrination	Captured Directive	Document	I	Vietnamese
4 Nov 67	Forward Under Glorious Banner	<i>Nhan Dan</i> Article	Newspaper	E	Vietnamese
20 Dec 67	NVA/NLF Friction	Captured Vietcong Directive	Document	I	Vietnamese

Jan 68	1968 State Plan	<i>Hoc Tap</i> Article	Magazine	E	Vietnamese
Feb 68	Tet Leaflets	13 Leaflets Obtained During Tet	Leaflet	E	Vietnamese
6 Feb 68	Tet Progress	Captured Cadre Report	Document	I	Vietnamese
10 Feb 68	Tet Assessment	Captured Cadre Report	Document	I	Vietnamese
Mar 68	COSVN Resolution No. 6	Captured Party Trng Document	Document	I	Vietnamese
10 May 68	Peace Talks	Captured Indoctrination Notes	Document	I	Vietnamese
2 Jun 68	NVA/NLF Friction	Captured Reorientation Dir	Document	I	Vietnamese
10 Jun 68	Tet Phase II Assessment	Captured COSVN Directive	Document	I	Vietnamese
28 Oct 68	Bombing Halt	Captured Party Directive	Document	I	Vietnamese
17 Jan 69	1969 State Plan	Broadcast Commentary	Radio	E	Vietnamese
12 Feb 69	Decisive Victory, Step by Step	Captured COSVN Directive	Document	I	Vietnamese
1 Mar 69	Opening Phase II	Captured Orientation Notes	Document	I	Vietnamese
14 May 69	10-Point Proposal	DRV Nat Reunification Com	Radio	E	English
23 May 69	Situation & Missions Summer 69	Captured Training Outline	Document	I	Vietnamese
22 Jun 69	Speech to Air Force Congress	Broadcast Text of Speech	Radio	E	Vietnamese
Jul 69	COSVN Resolution No. 9	Captured COSVN Resolution	Document	I	Vietnamese
6 Aug 69	Speech to 3d Mil Sector Conf	Broadcast of Giap Speech	Radio	E	Vietnamese
Sep 69	Grasp All Opportunities	Elaboration of COSVN Dir No. 8	Document	I	Vietnamese
4 Sep 69	Ho Chi Minh's Death	Worker's Party Appeal	Radio	E	Vietnamese
4 Sep 69	Ho Chi Minh's Death	Cease-fire Announce to Europe	Radio	E	Vietnamese
Dec 69	Party's Military Line	Broadcast of Army News Article	Radio	E	Vietnamese
4 Dec 69	Communiqué	Issued by NLF Conference	Flier	E	Vietnamese
Jan 71	COSVN Directive No. 01/CT71	Captured Summary	Document	I	Vietnamese
26 Jun 71	DRV Peace Proposal	Broadcast of Tho to Kissinger	Radio	E	French
1 Jul 71	PRG Peace Proposal	Detailed Pub of Tho to Kissinger	Newspaper	E	Vietnamese
Jan 72	Arm Revolutionary Masses	Serialized Giap Article	Radio	E	Vietnamese
24 Jan 72	10-Point Len & Hum Policy	Hanoi to South Vietnam	Radio	E	Vietnamese
22 Mar 72	Planned Uprising--Saigon	Two Captured Letters	Document	I	Vietnamese
Apr 72	Grasp This Opportunity	Party Magazine Article	Magazine	E	Vietnamese
12 May 72	Le Duc Tho News Conference	Regarding Paris Peace Talks	Radio	E	French
Mid-72	Saigon Committee Resolutions	Captured	Document	I	Vietnamese
Undated	COSVN Directive No. 8	Captured Notes	Document	I	Vietnamese
Undated	Motivation Task	Captured Plan for Occupied Area	Document	I	Vietnamese
17 Aug 72	Failure of Allies	Editorial in <i>Nhan Dan</i>	Newspaper	E	Vietnamese
11 Sep 72	PRG Statement	Negotiating Position	Radio	E	Vietnamese
4 Oct 72	B.45 Plan of General Uprising	Captured Plan for Seizing Danang	Document	I	Vietnamese

19 Oct 72	Danang Meeting	Captured Report of Party Meeting	Document	I	Vietnamese
15 Oct 72	COSVN Dir No. 20/H	Captured Area Reorientation Plan	Document	I	Vietnamese
23 Oct 72	Danang Meeting	Captured Report of Party Meeting	Document	I	Vietnamese
26 Oct 72	Paris Peace Talks	Statement on Negotiations	Radio	E	Vietnamese
28 Oct 72	Danang Uprising	Captured Cease-Fire-Day Plan	Document	I	Vietnamese
31 Oct 72	Support for DRV Peace Proposal	Saigon NLF Committee Report	Radio	E	Vietnamese
17 Dec 72	Paris Peace Talks	Statement on Negotiations	Radio	E	English
17 Dec 72	Paris Peace Talks	Commentary on Negotiations	Radio	E	Vietnamese
19 Dec 72	Paris Peace Talks	Statement on Negotiations	Radio	E	French
21 Dec 72	Bombing and Talks	PRG Statement at Talks	Radio	E	English
27 Dec 72	Bombing	Statement by Foreign Minister	Radio	E	English
19 Jan 73	Cease-Fire Policies	Captured COSVN Dir No. 02/73	Document	I	Vietnamese

*Many communications were release via multiple media. This table labels each message according to the medium by which it reached the largest audience.

**This column refers to the language in which the original message was communicated. The study examined English translations of all communications.

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¹For a theoretical analysis of various approaches the US employed to coerce North Vietnam, see Robert A. Pape, Jr., "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," *International Security*, Fall 1990, (Vol. 15, No. 2), 103.

²Alexander L. George, *Propaganda Analysis*, (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1959), ix.

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³Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), xi.

⁴Robert A. Pape, Jr., "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," *International Security*, Fall 1990, (Vol. 15, No. 2), 113.

⁵Clodfelter, 43-44.

⁶Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 3-6.

⁷Cited by Pape in "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," 114.

⁸Clodfelter, 101.

⁹*Ibid.*, 76.

¹⁰Earl H. Tilford, Jr., *Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1991), 93.

¹¹Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," 116.

¹²Clodfelter, 68.

¹³McNamara and Sharp disagree on this detail. McNamara's report of the Honolulu meeting asserted that all the participants agreed that the tempo was "about right;" however, Admiral Sharp later claimed he objected to gradual escalation but his views did not appear in McNamara's published account of the conference. See Clodfelter, p. 81 and US. Grant Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 80.

¹⁴Clodfelter, 81.

¹⁵Tilford, 108.

¹⁶Actually, Rolling Thunder began to focus on interdiction as early as April 1965, but in August interdiction became the dominant targeting rationale. See Clodfelter, 81-84 and 88-89.

¹⁷Tilford, 115.

¹⁸Clodfelter, 88-91.

¹⁹Ibid., 92.

²⁰Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," 119.

²¹Clodfelter, 111-112.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., 113-114.

²⁴Ibid., 147.

²⁵Ibid., 149-150.

²⁶Ibid., 148.

²⁷Ibid., 158.

²⁸Ibid., 166

²⁹Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," 135.

³⁰Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 645.

³¹Ibid., 647.

³²Clodfelter, 171.

³³Tilford, 250.

³⁴Clodfelter, 181-182.

³⁵Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," 137.

³⁶Ibid., 135.

³⁷Clodfelter, 178.

³⁸Tilford, 253.

³⁹Clodfelter, 182.

⁴⁰Tilford, 263.

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⁴¹Oliver Thompson, *Mass Persuasion in History: An Historical Analysis of the Development of Propaganda Techniques* (New York: Crans, Ruasak, & Company, Inc., 1972), 7.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 3.

⁴³Robert T. Holt and Robert Van de Velde, "Strategic Psychological Operations," *Propaganda and International Relations*, compiled and edited by Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), 7.

⁴⁴Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, translated from the French by Konrad Kellers and Jacques Lerner (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 53-55.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 53-55.

⁴⁶Alexander L. George, *Propaganda Analysis* (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1959), 20.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 21-22.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 25-26.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 20.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 21.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 127.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 5.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 37-38.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 42.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 43.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 40.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 59.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 47-48.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 45-46.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 65.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 24.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 25.

⁶⁶Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), 80.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 15.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 65.

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⁶⁹Douglas Pike, *People's Army of Vietnam: PAVN* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 9.

⁷⁰Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 242.

⁷¹Lawrence E. Grinter, "Cultural and Historical Influences on Conflict in Sinic Asia: China, Japan, and Vietnam," in *Culture, Conflict, & History: Regional Perspectives* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 163-164.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 176-177.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 178.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 165. The expressions Grinter quotes in this passage are from Alexander Woodsides, "Vietnam and Laos: The Continuing Crisis," a paper presented at the American Historical Association, Washington D.C., December 1969, as cited by William J. Turley in his "Vietnam's Strategy for Indochina and Security in Southeast Asia," in *Security, Strategy, and Policy Responses in the Pacific Rim*, ed. Young W. Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 178-179.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 178.

⁷⁶Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 64-88.

⁷⁷Pye, 236.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 215.

⁷⁹L.M. Hopfe, *Religions of the World* (Encino, CA: Glencoe Publishing Co., 1976), 128.

⁸⁰The eight-fold path consists of: right views, right intentions, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right mindfulness, right effort, and right concentration.

⁸¹Nguyen Khac Vien, "Confucianism and Marxism," in *Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam*, Trans. by Linda Yarr, Jayne Werner, and Tran Tuong Nhu (Berkeley, CA: Indochina Resource Center, 1974), 21.

⁸²*Ibid.*, 17.

⁸³Confucius, born 551 B.C. as Chung Ni Chu in Shantung, China, taught his doctrine as a philosophy, not a religion. His teachings dealt exclusively with man and society and rejected all forms of supernaturalism. However, in the centuries after his death some followers came to regard him as a saint, erecting temples and conducting sacrifices in his name. Undoubtedly, this occurred in Vietnam as well as China. It must be stressed, however, that Confucianism is principally an ethical philosophy, and that is the context of its influence on Vietnamese culture. See Richard Cavendish, *The Eastern Religions* (New York: Arco Publications, 1980), 88-89.

⁸⁴Vien, 26 and 32.

⁸⁵Ibid., 30-31.

⁸⁶Ibid., 29. Vien had a first-hand understanding of Confucianism. He was born in 1913, the son of a mandarin official in the French colonial administration. Educated by the French, Vien became a physician. However, sometime in the 1940s he became a Communist, and in the 1950s he was a leading activist in France. Returning to North Vietnam in 1961, Vien first became the editor of the periodical, *Courrier du Vietnam*, but he rapidly ascended the propaganda hierarchy until, during the war with the U.S., he directed the production of all DRV foreign-language publications. See the preface to *Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam*, x-xiii.

⁸⁷Ibid., 17.

⁸⁸Ibid., 22.

⁸⁹Pye, 61.

⁹⁰The metaphysical concepts underlying Taoism are very similar to Buddhism--so much so that when Buddhism entered China from India, Taoist intellectuals first dismissed it as an inferior version of Taoism. Ironically, Taoism is also compatible with Confucianism but for different reasons. Where Confucianism's worldly doctrine focuses on man's relationship to man, Taoism is a passive philosophy that concerns itself with man's relationship to nature. Thus, they coexist without competing. See Vien, 26-27 and Cavendish, 93.

⁹¹J.K. Fiebleman, *Understanding Oriental Philosophy: A Popular Account for the Western World* (New York: Horizon Press, 1976), 146.

⁹²Pye, 45.

⁹³Ibid., 202.

⁹⁴Tran Van Tra, "Tet: The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising," in *The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives*, ed. Jayne S. Werver and Luu Doan Huynh (Armonk N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 1993), 52.

⁹⁵Vien, 51.

⁹⁶Ibid., 16.

⁹⁷Ibid., 35-50.

⁹⁸Ibid., 47.

⁹⁹Pike, 16.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 13-16.

¹⁰¹Pye, 240.

¹⁰²This assumes the cultural or ideological differences are not so severe that they change the organizational or hierarchical relationships between the propagandist and the political elite. Those relationships are similar enough between Nazi Germany and the DRV to use the same action schema.

¹⁰³Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), 15.

¹⁰⁴Other writers and analysts usually classify all the propaganda produced for international consumption as external and all the propaganda targeted for domestic audiences as internal. The definitions used in this study are tailored to the unique attributes of the data set under examination.

¹⁰⁵For examples see captured documents: "NFL Thoughts on Peace Negotiations, World Policies--A Cadre's Notes on a High Level 1967 Reorientation Course" and "The New Situation and Mission: A Viet Cong Training Document," provided in *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes Series: Translation and Analysis of Significant Vietcong/North Vietnamese Documents*, ed. by Robert E. Lester (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1991), Document Nos. 14 and 20, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 305-314 and 360-371, January and March 1968.

¹⁰⁶See Troung Nhu Tang, *A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and its Aftermath* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985) and captured documents "Friction Between Northern and Southern Vietnamese: Directives Urge Standing 'Shoulder-to-Shoulder With Our Kith-and-Kin Brothers,'" Document Nos. 43 and 44, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 576-583, September 1968.

¹⁰⁷"B.45 Plan of General Uprising When a General Settlement is Reached," provided in "The Communists Aborted Plans for the Seizure of Danang," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 109, Reel 6, Frame No. 230, December 1972, 20.

¹⁰⁸Douglas Pike, *People's Army of Vietnam: PAVN* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 30.

¹⁰⁹For example, see the lengthy section entitled, "Requirements for Building Ideological Awareness" in captured Vietcong Document, "Directive 20/H," Provided in "PRP Abandons 1972 Plans for a Revolution in Saigon," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 108, Reel 6, Frame Nos. 201-203, November 1972, 27-29.

¹¹⁰This section also examines a 1962 interview with Pham Van Dong and Ho Chi Minh and an October 1968 party directive to compare elite policies and perceptions before and after the bombing campaign.

¹¹¹Bernard B. Fall, "A Talk With Ho Chi Minh," in *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution*, ed. and introduction by Bernard B. Fall (New York: Signet Books, 1967), 319-321.

¹¹²Pham Van Dong, "The Position of North Viet-nam on Negotiations," reported by various Hanoi news media and provided in *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 8, Reel 1, Frame No. 5, October 1967, 3.

¹¹³Ho Chi Minh, "Replies to an Interview with Japanese NDN TV," as printed in the *Vietnam Courier*, 21 April 1966 and reprinted in *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution*, 335.

¹¹⁴How Chi Minh, "Our Entire People, United as one Man, Are Resolved to Defeat the U.S. Aggressors," a speech to the National Assembly, printed in the *Vietnam Courier*, 28 April 1966 and reprinted in *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution*, 338.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, 339.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, 338-341.

¹¹⁷Nguyen Van Trinh, *Hoc Tap*, April 1967, excerpts provided in "The Position of North Viet-nam on Negotiations," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 8, Reel 1, Frame No. 212, October 1967, 10.

¹¹⁸Van Tien Dung, "General Van Tien Dung on Some Great Experiences of the People's War," provided in *Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Communist Military Writings, 1964-1968*, ed. by Patrick J. McGarvey (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), 150.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 155.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 159.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, 152.

¹²²Pham Van Dong, excerpts from his 31 August 1967 National Day speech as broadcast over Hanoi Radio on 2 September 1967 and provided in *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 8, Reel 1, Frame No. 213, October 1967, 11.

¹²³Nguyen Van Vinh, from "The Position of North Viet-nam on Negotiations, *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 8, Reel 1, Frame No. 206, October 1967, 4.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*

¹²⁵"NLF Thoughts on Peace Negotiations, World Policies: A Cadre's Notes on a High Level 1967 Reorientation Course," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 14, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 307-311, January 1968, 3-7.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, 2.

¹²⁷"The New Situation and Mission: A Viet Cong Training Document," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 20, Reel 1, Frame No. 360, March 1968, 1.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, 6-7.

¹²⁹Working from a translation, it is impossible to be certain, but it appears the Communists avoided using the historically-significant term "*thoi co*" in this paper. Nowhere in the translation does the expression "time opportunity" appear, and translators made no reference to *thoi co* in their introduction. If *thoi co* had been mentioned, it would have been a clear indication that a major offensive was imminent. Documents later obtained during the Tet Offensive did refer to the attack as a *thoi co* event. See "'Time Opportunity: The Uprising Appeal of Viet Cong Leaflets,'" *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 22, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 380-395, March 1968, 1-16.

¹³⁰"The New Situation and Mission: A Viet Cong Training Document," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 20, Reel 1, Frame No. 368, March 1968, 9.

¹³¹Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 111-112.

¹³²"The New Situation and Mission: A Viet Cong Training Document," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 20, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 360-370, March 1968, 1-11.

¹³³"Indoctrination Notes on Peace Talks: A Call for 'Violent Revolution' to the End," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 39, Reel 1, Frame No. 532, July 1968, 1.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*

¹³⁵"Peace Talks," a 10 May 1968 document included in "Indoctrination Notes on Peace Talks: A Call for 'Violent Revolution' to the End," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 39, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 535-536, July 1968, 4-5.

¹³⁶Ho Chi Minh, "The Position of North Viet-Nam on Negotiations," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 8, Reel 1, Frame No. 208, October 1967, 6.

¹³⁷Le Duan, "The Same Historical Chain," an article in *Nhan Dan* and provided in *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 9, Reel 1, Frame No. 267, December 1967, 13.

¹³⁸See *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document Nos. 14 and 28, Reel 1, Frame Nos 305-314 and 436-450.

¹³⁹Dung, 155.

¹⁴⁰See *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document Nos. 8 and 14, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 203-214 and 436-450.

¹⁴¹For examples, see the 12 extracts provided in "The Position of North Viet-Nam on Negotiations," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 8 (Reel 1, Frame Nos. 203-214) and Ho Chi Minh's 16 December 1965 interview with Felix Greene, "Let the U.S. Imperialists Withdraw Their Troops From South Viet-nam and Peace Will Be Immediately Restored," 17 July 1966 speech over Hanoi Radio, "Fight Until Complete Victory," and "Interview With the French Magazine *L'evenement*," provided in Fall, 330-335, 341-343, and 343-346.

¹⁴²Nguyen Van Vinh, from "The Position of North Viet-Nam on Negotiations," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 8, Reel 1, Frame No. 206, October 1967, 4.

¹⁴³Clodfelter, 139.

¹⁴⁴Analyzing anticipatory propaganda involves watching for telltale signs in enemy communications that suggest the propagandist is attempting to prepare his audience for an unfortunate turn of events. Abrupt changes in policy can have considerable psychological shock in a totalitarian regime that constantly indoctrinates its followers in the correctness of its actions. Consequently, propagandists often attempt to cushion that shock by hinting in advance that changes may be in order, and these hints forewarn propaganda analysts as well. See Alexander L. George, *Propaganda Analysis* (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1959), 174.

¹⁴⁵See "Indoctrination Notes on Peace Talks: A Call for 'Violent Revolution' to the End," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 39, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 532-533, 1-2.

¹⁴⁶See *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document Nos. 39, 61, and 62.

¹⁴⁷Quoted in Dung, 156.

¹⁴⁸Dung, 160-161.

¹⁴⁹One cannot fully appreciate the strategic significance of this elite perception without examining it through the Vietnamese cultural lens. North Vietnamese leaders viewed their struggle with the U.S. from a Taoist perspective; the shifting balance of forces characterized an ebb and flow of the Tao. As the bombing escalated, the positive force of U.S. resolve was seen to be growing. But when Johnson announced Rolling Thunder would end, North Vietnam concluded that the energy had reached its culmination and, despite its tactical strength on the ground, U.S. strategic power in Vietnam would enter a phase of inevitable decline.

¹⁵⁰Nguyen Van Dai, "Plan for Strengthening the Vast Rear Base and the Vast Front Line: North Viet-nam State Plan for 1969," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 53, Reel 1, Frame No. 717, March 1969, 2.

¹⁵¹"The 'Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,' Part I: Preparing to Form the PRG," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 101 (Part I), Reel 5, Frame No. 13, January 1972, 11.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*

¹⁵³*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁵⁶Nguyen Giap, from his July 1969 speech as broadcast on Hanoi Domestic Service on 6 August 1969 and presented in "Two Speeches by General Vo Nguyen Giap," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 68, Reel 2, Frame No. 175, November 1969, 32.

¹⁵⁷"The Death and Funeral of Ho Chi Minh: The Broadcast Record," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 66, Reel 2, Frame Nos. 20-23, September 1969, 19-22.

¹⁵⁸ The PRGSV's Ten Point 'Lenient and Humanitarian' Policy," provided in "The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-nam, Part IV: The PRG's Diplomatic Offensive," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 101 (Part IV), Reel 5, Frame No. 215, January 1972, viii.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, ix.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, x.

¹⁶¹Henry A. Kissinger, extract of 9 May 1972 news conference provided in, *Vietnam: A History in Documents*, ed. by Gareth Porter (New York: New American Library, Inc., 1979), 406.

¹⁶²Le Duc Tho, extract of 12 May 1972 news conference provided in, *Vietnam: A History in Documents*, 407-408.

¹⁶³"Editorial in *Nhan Dan*, August 17, 1972 [Extract]," from *Vietnam: A History in Documents*, 408.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 409.

¹⁶⁶"Statement of the PRG, September 11, 1972 [Extract]," from *Vietnam: A History in Documents*, 409.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸Thieu's concerns were substantial. Among other things, he objected to an in-place cease fire that legitimized the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. He also objected to the "council of national reconciliation" the agreement called for and wording that referred to a single Vietnam versus the Northern and Southern states. See Earl H. Tilford, *Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1991), 149-150.

¹⁶⁹"Statement of the DRV Government, October 26, 1972 [Extract]," from *Vietnam: A History in Documents*, 411-415.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 415.

¹⁷¹Throughout the Linebacker campaigns, the U.S. and DRV conducted two simultaneous negotiations: the public peace talks between the U.S. State Department and North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry and secret talks between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. Both proceedings took place in Paris. See Clodfelter, 168-199.

¹⁷²Martin F. Herz, "North Vietnam's Statements on the Paris Talks, December 17 and 21, 1972," from *The Prestige Press and the Christmas Bombing, 1972: Images and Reality in Vietnam*, Assisted by Leslie-Rider (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1980), 81-82.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, 83.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 84.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 84-85.

¹⁷⁶Herz, "North Vietnam's Statement on the Bombing December 27, 1972," 86.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 86-87.

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁸⁰Numerous external propaganda messages expressed these themes between 1968 and 1972. Furthermore, this strategy is explicitly laid out in an internal Vietcong directive captured 1 March 1969 entitled, "Matters to be Grasped When Performing the Ideological Task in the Party Body," provided in "Decisive Victory, Step by Step, Bit by Bit," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 61, Reel 1, Frame Nos. 782-786, June 1969, 3-7.

¹⁸¹For example, see "Outline of the Additional Training Material on the Situation and Missions of the Summer 1969," an "Absolute Secret" document produced by the T7 Propaganda and Training Section, Central Office, South Vietnam (Vietcong), presented in "The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-nam, Part I: Preparing to Form the PRG," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 101 (Part I), Reel 5, Frame Nos. 44-58, January 1972, 42-56.

¹⁸²For example, see the "Resolution of Saigon-Gia Dinh Committee People's Revolutionary Party, mid-1972," in "PRP Abandons 1972 Plans for a Revolution in Saigon," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 108, Reel 6, Frame Nos. 181-185, December 1972, 8-12.

¹⁸³See the first five of six documents that comprise "PRP Abandons 1972 Plans for a Revolution in Saigon," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 108, Reel 6, Frame Nos. 174-198, December 1972, 1-25.

¹⁸⁴"Statement of the PRG, September 11, 1972 [Extract]," from *Vietnam: A History in Documents*, 409.

¹⁸⁵Clodfelter, 168.

¹⁸⁶Dung, 156.

¹⁸⁷Herz, "North Vietnam's Statement on the Bombing December 27, 1972," 87.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.

¹⁸⁹Clodfelter, 197.